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Matthew A. Halloran 
 
ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS FOR FACILITATING COOPERATION IN 
THE PROVISION OF PUBLIC GOODS 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
 Three essays approach the problem of methods to facilitate cooperation in the 
provision of public goods by expanding opportunities for reciprocity using the 
traditional voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM).  In the first two essays, 
mechanisms that allow subjects to sanction or reward other group members are 
studied.  The third essay examines how the opportunity to make binding cooperative 
commitments affects behavior in the VCM. 
 In the first essay, rewards and sanctions are examined in a one-shot VCM 
setting that so far has been unexplored in the literature. The research finds that while 
some subjects are willing to reward and sanction others at a personal cost, the 
opportunity to reward or sanction is ineffective in facilitating cooperation relative to 
previous experiments in which a repeated game environment is employed.  The essay 
also compares behavior in decision situations in which the imposition of rewards and 
sanctions is certain to decision situations in which imposition is uncertain.  
Uncertainty does not change behavior in a significant way, either in the level of 
cooperation or the willingness of individuals to impose rewards or sanctions. 
 The second essay expands on the first essay by examining rewards and 
sanctions that vary in relative size in relation to the cost of their imposition. Each type 
of reward or sanction is examined in a one-shot voluntary contribution mechanism 
setting.  In every environment, some subjects are willing to reward or sanction other 
subjects at a personal cost.  Evidence is found that contributions are significantly 
 vi
increased in the environment in which the cost of sanctioning is the least relative to 
the size of the sanction.   
 Finally, the third essay examines the effect of allowing binding multi-round 
commitments to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism 
game.  Subjects are found to make commitments averaging between 25% and 35% of 
their endowments. However, total group-account allocations are not systematically 
greater on average in the commitment experiments than in otherwise identical control 
experiments without commitments.  Further analysis reveals that subjects respond to 
commitments in a reciprocal manner, and that the variance of outcomes across groups 
is larger in the commitment experiments than the control experiments. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 This dissertation focuses on experiments using the traditional voluntary 
contribution mechanism with a linear group account earning function. In the 
traditional VCM, subjects are placed in a group, and each receives an identical 
individual endowment of tokens.  Each subject then simultaneously chooses what 
percentage of his or her endowment to place in the group account and what 
percentage to retain in his or her private account.  A token placed in the group 
account gives a positive return to each group member.  A token placed in a subject's 
private account gives a positive return solely to that subject. In the most commonly 
studied form of the VCM the return from the group account and the return from the 
private account are symmetric across individuals, and are structured so that the group 
optimum is for all tokens to be allocated to the group account.  At the same time, if 
subjects' preferences are based solely on monetary returns, the dominant strategy for 
any individual is to place all their tokens in their private account.   
The stylized facts emerging from this type of experiment are that 
contributions to the group account exceed the standard economic prediction of zero 
tokens, but are substantially below the welfare maximizing level of 100% percent 
contributions.  Initially, contributions to the group account tend to average close to 
50% of the endowment. However, there is considerable heterogeneity across 
individuals in their choice of contributions. Further, when the baseline VCM setting is 
repeated, average contributions tend to diminish. (see Ledyard, 1995, for a survey.)   
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Because outcomes in the VCM have tended to be suboptimal, researchers 
have begun to investigate ways in which cooperation may be better established and 
maintained.  This dissertation focuses on two aspects of this expanding research.  
Chapters 2 and 3 examine the effect of allowing the sanctioning or rewarding of 
others in a one-shot (non-repeating) setting that so far has been unexplored in the 
literature.  Chapter 4 examines the effect of "commitment" in the traditional VCM.  
Experiments are presented in which subjects are permitted to make binding multi-
round commitments within a repeated VCM.  Finally, chapter 5 contains concluding 
remarks. 
Each essay in this dissertation adds a layer to the traditional VCM that can 
magnify the effect of orientations toward reciprocity.  In the research discussed in 
chapters 2 and 3, subjects can use reward and sanctioning abilities to reciprocate the 
behavior of other subjects in a more substantial way than is possible in a regular 
VCM.  While, the commitment opportunities discussed in the 4th chapter allow 
further opportunities for reciprocity by making information about other subjects' 
behavior more available, and therefore making the possibility of being exploited by 
"free riders" less.    
 In chapter 2, rewards and sanctions are examined in a one-shot VCM setting. 
Previous experiments examining opportunities to reward and sanction in VCM 
experiments have shown that significant increases in cooperation can be established 
in such environments, see Fehr and Gächter (2000), and Sefton Shupp and Walker 
(2001).  In the one-shot experiment presented in chapter 2, a significant number of 
subjects are found to be willing to reward or sanction others at a personal cost even 
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with no expectation of repeated interaction.  However, the opportunity to reward or 
sanction is ineffective at facilitating cooperation relative to the previous mentioned 
studies in which a repeated game environment is employed.  Chapter 2 also compares 
behavior in an environment in which the imposition of rewards and sanctions is 
certain to an environment in which imposition is uncertain.  The expected value of the 
reward or sanction is kept constant across environments to focus simply on the effect 
of uncertainty about imposition.  Uncertainty does not change behavior in a 
significant way, either in the level of cooperation or the willingness of individuals to 
impose rewards or sanctions. 
 Chapter 3 presents an experiment using the same one-shot setting of chapter 2.  
Chapter 2 revealed that sanctioning and rewarding opportunities are ineffective in 
facilitating cooperation in a one-shot VCM setting.  The experiment of chapter 3 was 
designed to examine whether this result may have been due to the fact that the 
sanction or reward a subject could expect to receive may have been too small to 
influence VCM behavior.  The results of the chapter 3 environments that replicate the 
chapter 2 experiment are consistent with the results presented in chapter 2.  The 
chapter 3 experiment includes environments in which the size of the reward or 
sanction a subject can impose is doubled relative to the cost of imposition.  No strong 
evidence exists that expanding the opportunity to reward increases group cooperation 
in a one-shot VCM setting.  However, cooperation within the VCM is significantly 
expanded in the environment in which opportunities to sanction are expanded.  This 
indicates that at least some additional cooperation can be encouraged by sanctioning 
opportunities within a one-shot VCM setting.   
 4
 Chapter 4 approaches the effect of "commitment" within the VCM.  The 
chapter examines the effect of allowing binding multi-round commitments of tokens 
to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions mechanism.  Before each 
five-round interval, subjects in a four-person group are given the option to commit a 
certain percentage of their token endowments to the group account over each of the 
next five rounds.  The total amount of tokens committed by the group is then made 
public to the group.  Each VCM round proceeds normally after commitments are 
made with each subject's commitment acting as the binding minimum of his or her 
group account allocation for that round.  Subjects have the option of increasing their 
group allocation above their commitment within each round.  The results of the 
commitment experiment are compared to the results of an otherwise identical VCM 
control experiment without commitments.  Subjects are willing to make binding 
commitments averaging between 1/4 and 1/3 of their token endowments for each 
round.  However, total group account allocations are not systematically greater on 
average in the binding commitment experiments than those observed in the control 
experiments.  Further analysis reveals that subjects respond to commitments in a 
reciprocal manner, and the variance of outcomes across groups is larger in the 
commitment experiments than the control experiments. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Rewards and Sanctions and the Provision of Public Goods in One-Shot Settings 
1. Introduction 
 As discussed in the introduction, because outcomes in the VCM tend to be 
sub-optimal, researchers have begun investigated ways in which cooperation may be 
established and maintained with opportunities to reward or sanction.  Ostrom, Walker 
and Gardner (1992) investigate the maintenance of cooperative decisions in a related 
dilemma game, and find that "covenants" or promises about future actions can be 
useful in maintaining cooperation, even when the promises are non-binding. They 
also find that cooperative agreements made verbally and supported by internal 
monetary sanctions, i.e. those imposed freely by group members, are even more 
powerful. On the other hand, they observe that the opportunity to sanction 
independent of verbal agreements to cooperate can actually lower group welfare, 
when the costs associated with sanctioning are taken into account. 
 Gächter and Fehr (2001) study sanctions within the VCM framework. They 
investigate a 2-stage 'punishment game'. The first stage corresponds to a single period 
of the voluntary contributions mechanism outlined above. In the second stage all 
individual contributions are revealed to the group and subjects have an opportunity to 
sanction each other.  Punishment is costly, both to the person punishing and the 
person being punished.  Contributions are significantly higher in the punishment 
game than in the VCM.   Notably, punishment opportunities are exercised in the Fehr 
and Gächter experiment, thus the increase in contributions overstates the welfare 
effect of sanctions - one must also account for the costs of punishment. Once this is 
 6
done the implications are ambiguous, and more in line with those observed by 
Ostrom, Walker, and Gardner (1992). 1 
 Sefton, Shupp, and Walker (2001) extend the literature on reciprocation 
opportunities by allowing for rewards as well as sanctions.  The structure of the 
Sefton, Shupp, and Walker experiment is similar to that of Fehr and Gächter except it 
also includes a 'rewarding game' in which subjects distribute rewards in the second 
stage instead of sanctions.  The sanctioning treatments in Sefton, Shupp, and Walker 
yield results consistent with Fehr and Gächter.  In the treatments that allow 
rewarding, they find that group account allocations increase, but subjects are better 
able to sustain contributions in the treatments that allow sanctioning. 
 This chapter extends the literature on rewards and sanctions by examining 
them in strictly one-shot environments.  In all of the previously cited studies, the 
game is repeated which means that it is possible for behavior in one round of the 
experiment to be dependent upon behavior in other rounds of the experiment.  
Subjects may use rewards and sanctions to influence the behavior of others in future 
rounds, and not solely to reward or sanction them for their behavior in the current 
round.  Fehr and Gächter (2001) deal with this problem indirectly by examining a 
"stranger" treatment in which subjects are randomly regrouped after each round of the 
experiment.  But, even in that case, a subject that has observed the sanctioning 
behavior of others may be influenced in future rounds even if he or she will not 
encounter the same group members again.   Within the one-shot setting investigated 
                                                 
1 Masclet et al. (2003) replicates the Fehr and Gachter (2001) experiment with similar results.  They 
also add a treatment in which subjects can display displeasure with other subjects but cannot 
monetarily punish them.  They find that this form of non-monetary punishment increases group 
account allocations, but not as effectively as monetary punishment. 
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here, several questions are addressed.  To what extent is cooperative behavior within 
the VCM increased when subjects can impose rewards and sanctions on other group 
members if there is no expectation of repeated interaction?  Secondly, to what extent 
are subjects willing to reward and sanction others at a personal cost when they cannot 
expect to receive any benefit in the form of increased cooperation in future rounds?  
 This chapter also introduces and examines within a one-shot environment the 
possibility that the imposition of a sanction or reward on the intended recipient may 
be uncertain.  For example, such a case may arise in certain team production 
environments in which there is uncertainty about whether a supervisor will be willing 
or able to enforce a sanction on a team member when informed of shirking.  This 
chapter allows comparisons between behavior in environments in which the 
imposition of a reward or sanction is uncertain to environments in which imposition 
of rewards and sanctions is certain. 
 The chapter is organized as follows.  The next section describes the 
experimental setting that is investigated.  Section 3 provides predictions based on 
available theory.  Section 4 presents the experimental results.  Finally, section 5 
contains concluding remarks.2  
2. Experimental Design 
  The experiment consisted of four sessions conducted in September and 
October 2001.  Twelve subjects recruited from introductory economics classes at 
Indiana University - Bloomington participated in each session.3  The sessions took 
                                                 
2 The research discussed in this chapter was published in Halloran and Walker (2004). 
3 A replicative experiment using experienced subjects was performed using 12 subjects drawn 
randomly from the original 48 subjects.  The results of the experiment are largely consistent with the 
results of the experiments referenced in the chapter, and are not included.   
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place in classrooms on campus.  Each session was conducted on paper with 
calculations being performed by the experimenters on computer terminals.  At the 
start of each session, subjects were presented with a packet that included initial 
instructions, separate instructions and decision sheets for each of five decision 
situations, and finally a questionnaire concerning general information about the 
subjects and the motivation of their decisions.4                       
The initial instructions informed the subjects of the general structure of the 
decision situations, and the following introductory information.  The subjects were 
informed that they would make choices in five separate decision situations, but only 
be compensated based on the outcome of one of the decision situations to be chosen 
randomly at the end of the experiment.5  They were also informed that they would be 
randomly assigned to a four-person group in each of the five decision situations.   
Finally, they were informed that in all but the first decision situation, there would be 
two stages.   Importantly, they were made aware that they would make their first 
stage decision in each decision situation and then the decision sheets would be 
collected and prepared for them to then make their second stage decisions in each 
decision situation.  The instructions were public.  The experimenter reviewed the 
initial instructions with the subjects, and each decision situation as the decision 
situations progressed.   
In the first stage of each of the five decision situations, the subjects 
participated in a VCM structured in the following way.  Each subject was endowed 
with 10 "blue" tokens to be allocated between their private account and the group 
                                                 
4 The instructions and decision sheets given to each subject are presented in this chapter's Appendix A. 
5 At the end of the experiment, a card was drawn from a set of five to determine which of the five 
decision situations would be used to determine earnings. 
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account.6  For each blue token placed in his or her private account a subject received 
$1.  For each blue token placed in the group account, each group member received 50 
cents, a total of $2.00 for the 4-person group.   
Four of the five decision situations had a second stage. In the baseline VCM 
decision situation, there was no second stage.   In the other four decision situations 
subjects were informed of the aggregate allocation to the group account in the first 
stage, the allocation of each individual to the group account in the first stage, and 
their own first stage earnings.7  Subjects then participated in a second stage in which 
each was endowed with 10 "green" tokens that could be used to reward or sanction 
the other subjects in their group based upon their first stage decisions.8  In the certain 
reward decision situation, a green token could be used to increase the earnings of 
another group member by 20 cents.  In the certain sanction decision situation, a green 
token could be used to lower the earnings of another group member by 20 cents.  In 
the uncertain reward decision situation, a green token could be used to increase the 
earnings of another group member but with uncertain results.  A green token had a 
50% chance of increasing the other group member's earnings by 40 cents, and a 50% 
chance of leaving the earnings of the other group member unchanged.  In the 
uncertain sanction decision situation, the uncertainty took a similar form.  A green 
token had a 50% chance of lowering another group member's earnings by 40 cents, 
and a 50% chance of leaving the other group members earnings unchanged.  Notice 
                                                 
6 The tokens were referred to as "blue" in the instructions to distinguish them from the "green" tokens 
that would be used for sanctioning and reward opportunities. 
7 Individual decisions were not linked to subject identifiers, subjects were never aware of the identities 
of the other members of their group. 
8 In the instructions, the words "reward" and "sanction" were never used.  The instructions referred to 
opportunities to increase or decrease the earnings of other group members. 
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that the expected value of rewards and sanctions is kept constant across decision 
situations to focus solely on the effects of uncertainty. 
In each decision situation, any green token not used to reward or sanction 
another group member was placed in a subject's private account where it earned 20 
cents.  The subjects could use any number of green tokens to change another subject's 
earnings, the only rule being that the total number of green tokens they used to 
change the earnings of their other three group members summed to 10 or less.  In the 
sanctioning situations this implies a sanction reduces both the earnings of the subject 
imposing the sanction and the subject being sanctioned.  Rewards however, take a 
different form.  In the certain environment, they constitute a zero-sum transfer of 
earnings from the subject giving the reward to the subject receiving it.  In the 
uncertain environment, they represent a zero-sum transfer only in the expected value 
sense.  
The order of the decision situations was different in the final two sessions as 
opposed to the first two sessions.  Table 1 summarizes design information.  The 
decision situations were not referred to by name; they were called decision situation 
1, decision situation 2, etc.  At the end of the experiment, subjects privately received 
their earnings which included a $5 participation fee, their earnings from the one 
decision situation that was randomly selected, and a further $2 fee for completing the 
end of experiment questionnaire.   
An important point about the previously described experimental structure 
deserves special mention.  The structure was intentionally chosen to keep each 
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decision situation as independent from the other decision situations as possible.9  
Subjects were randomly placed in a different 4-person group for each decision 
situation.  Also, all first stage VCM decisions in each of the five decision situations 
were made before any second stage sanctioning or rewarding opportunities.  Finally, 
individuals never observed the sanctioning and rewarding behavior of other 
subjects.10 
3. Predictions 
 If one assumes that subjects make decisions to maximize own earnings, the 
Nash equilibrium of the Baseline VCM decision situation is for all group account 
allocations to equal zero.  In the decision situations that allow rewards or sanctions, 
the equilibrium predictions are also straightforward.  In every case it cannot be 
equilibrium behavior to sanction or reward another group member if one is 
maximizing own earnings.  Subjects will never sanction or reward because doing so 
lowers own earnings.  Further, subjects playing the first stage VCM can expect to not 
be sanctioned or rewarded in the second stage, and will therefore choose a group 
account allocation of zero.  Therefore, the unique subgame perfect equilibria of the 
decision situations that allow rewards and sanctions involve zero allocations to the 
group account without any use of sanctions or rewards. 
 However, as noted in the introduction, behavior in VCM studies has not 
conformed to the previously discussed prediction of zero group account allocations.  
                                                 
9 The one case in which behavior in one decision situation could be influenced by behavior in other 
decision situations is in the second stage reward or sanction choices made in the final four decision 
situations.  For example, strong free riding behavior encountered in one decision situation may make a 
person more willing to reward cooperative behavior in another decision situation. 
 
10 The experimental data is presented in this chapter's appendix B. 
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Contributions tend to be non-zero.  Newer modeling approaches have turned to more 
complicated representations of subject preferences beyond simple maximization of 
own earnings.  For example, subjects may be altruistic as in Andreoni (1988), or 
subjects may receive utility from reciprocating the behavior of others as in Falk and 
Fischbacher (2000).  Within a VCM game a subject can be altruistic or practice 
reciprocity by adjusting his or her group account allocation.  But, opportunities to 
reward and sanction allow reciprocation to be targeted toward individuals.   
4. Results  
4.1 Group Account Allocations 
 Table 2 reports the average allocation by individuals to the group account in 
each of the decision situations.  Figure 1 displays the cumulative distributions of 
individual group account allocations in each of the five decision situations. 
Result 1. Behavior in the baseline VCM decision situation is consistent with other 
studies.  Subjects, on average, allocate about half of their endowment to the group 
account. 
  
 As shown in Table 2, subjects allocate 53.33% of their tokens to the group 
account on average.  This is consistent with first round behavior in repeated game 
studies that share a marginal per-capita return from the group account of 0.5.11  There 
is considerable variation in individual behavior.  However, the most common 
behavior is either for individuals to place their entire endowment in the group 
account, 27.08% of subjects (the Pareto efficient result), or to contribute no tokens to 
the group account and retain their endowments in their private account, 29.17% of 
subjects (the Nash equilibrium result).   
                                                 
11 In Sefton, Shupp, and Walker (2001) subjects allocate 53% of their endowment to the group account 
in the first round.  In Swope (2000), they allocate 45%. 
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Result 2. The opportunity to reward other group members, whether the rewards are 
certain or uncertain, does not have a statistically significant effect on allocations to 
the group account relative to group account allocations in the baseline VCM decision 
situation.  
 
 As shown in Table 2, the mean group allocation in the baseline VCM decision  
situation is greater than or equal to mean group allocations in both the certain reward 
and the uncertain reward decision situation.  This is true in both orderings of the 
decision situations, as well as overall.  The differences are not statistically 
significant.12  As shown in Figure 1, the cumulative distributions of individual group 
allocations in the certain reward and the uncertain reward decision situations appear 
very similar to the cumulative distribution of individual group allocations in the 
baseline VCM decision situation.  
Result 3. The opportunity to sanction other group members, whether the sanctions are 
certain or uncertain, does not have a statistically significant effect on allocations to 
the group account relative to group account allocations in the baseline VCM decision 
situation.  
 
 As shown in Table 2, overall mean group account contribution in the certain 
sanction decision situation is slightly smaller than the mean contribution in the 
baseline VCM, while the mean contribution in the uncertain sanction decision 
situation is slightly larger.  In both cases, the differences are not statistically 
significant.13  As shown in Figure 1, the cumulative distributions of individual group 
allocations in the certain sanction and uncertain sanction decision situations appear 
                                                 
12 Using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test, the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
group account allocations is identical in the baseline VCM  and the certain reward decision situations 
cannot be rejected  (p = 0.2558).  The null hypothesis that the distribution of group allocations is 
identical in the baseline VCM and the uncertain reward decision situations also cannot be rejected (p = 
0.4654). 
13 Using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, the null hypothesis that the distribution of 
group allocations is identical in the baseline VCM and the certain sanction decision situations cannot 
be rejected (p = 0.7916).  The null hypothesis that the distribution of group allocations is identical in 
the baseline VCM and the uncertain sanction decision situations also cannot be rejected (p = 0.4557) 
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quite similar to the cumulative distribution of individual group allocations in the 
baseline VCM decision situation.  
Result 4. Variation in the group account allocations of individual subjects across 
decision situations is small. 
 
 The average standard deviation of group account allocations across the five 
decision situations for individual subjects is 1.51 tokens.  Figure 2 displays the 
standard deviation of group account allocations in the five decision situations for each 
subject.  More than 73% of subjects have a standard deviation less than 2.14 
4.2 The Use of Sanctions and Reward 
 
Result 5. Subjects use sanctions and rewards in one-shot environments. 
 
 Table 3 displays the average percentage of second stage token endowments 
that are used to reward or sanction in the four decision situations in which rewarding 
and sanctioning are possible.  In each decision situation, subjects use approximately 
20% of their token endowments on average for the purpose of rewarding or 
sanctioning other subjects in their group.  Table 3 also displays the percentage of 
subjects that use at least one token to reward or sanction other group members in each 
decision situation.  In every decision situation, more than a third of subjects are 
willing to use at least some of their endowment to reward or sanction other group 
members.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 A Friedman test provides further evidence for results 2 through 4.  The test shows no  
significant differences across the five decision situations (p = 0.7761). 
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Result 6. In the reward decision situations, a subject tends to receive a larger reward 
the larger is his or her group allocation relative to the average group allocation of 
other group members. 
  
General support for Result 6 is provided by Figure 3.  Figure 3 shows the 
average number of reward tokens received as a function of an individual's deviation 
from the average group allocation of other group members for both the certain 
reward and the uncertain reward decision situations.  In Figure 3 it is apparent that 
those that make group allocations above the average of other group members receive 
larger rewards than those that do not.  This effect is much more pronounced in the 
case of the certain reward decision situation.  In a result that is consistent with 
Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2001), it is not apparent that large positive deviations 
from the average are rewarded much more generously than small positive deviations. 
 Following Fehr and Gachter (2000) and Sefton, Shupp, and Walker (2001), a 
regression model is estimated to provide more formal evidence of Result 6.  A Tobit 
specification is used with total reward tokens received by a subject as the dependent 
variable.  The independent variables are: 1) the average contribution of other group 
members, 2) the subject's absolute negative deviation from the average contribution 
of others, and 3) the subject's absolute positive deviation from the average 
contribution of others.15  For Result 6 to hold, a negative deviation should lower one's 
reward, and a positive deviation should increase one's reward.  Table 4 provides 
results.  In both the certain reward and uncertain reward decision situations, 
"absolute negative deviation" and "absolute positive deviation" have the expected 
signs.  "Absolute positive deviation" has a negligible marginal effect and is not 
                                                 
15 If the average allocation of other group members is Xbar, and a subject's individual allocation is X, 
absolute negative deviation is defined as max { 0,  Xbar - X } and absolute positive deviation is 
defined as max { 0, X - Xbar }. 
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statistically significant in the case of the uncertain reward decision situation.  In both 
cases "other's average allocation" has a positive sign meaning that groups with a large 
average group allocation tend to reward more, but "other's average allocation" is not 
statistically significant in either case. 
Result 7. In the sanction decision situations, a subject tends to receive a larger 
sanction the smaller is his or her group allocation relative to the average group 
allocation of other group members. 
  
 Support for Result 7 is provided by Figure 4 and Table 4.  Figure 4 shows the  
number of tokens used to sanction a subject as a function of the subject's deviation 
from the average contribution of other group members for both the certain sanction 
and the uncertain sanction decision situation.  Results are similar in both sanctioning 
situations and in both cases subjects with group allocations below the average 
allocation of others receive the bulk of the sanctions.  Formal evidence for Result 7 is 
provided by Table 4.  A similar regression to that used in the case of rewards is 
performed for the sanctioning decision situations.  In both the certain sanction and 
uncertain sanction decision situations "absolute negative deviation" is positive and 
statistically significant.  The regression analysis suggests one interesting difference 
between the certain sanction and uncertain sanction decision situations.  The 
marginal effect of “absolute negative deviation” on the size of the sanction a subject 
receives is more than twice as large in the uncertain sanction decision situation. 
4.3 Efficiency 
Result 8. Allocative efficiency is similar across all decision situations. 
  
 Define efficiency as total subject earnings as a percentage of maximum 
possible subject earnings.  Table 5 provides efficiency results for all five decision 
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situations.  It includes efficiency percentages for earnings just from the first stage 
VCM, and also overall efficiencies for the entire two stage game.16  The overall 
efficiencies listed for the uncertain sanction and uncertain reward decision situations 
are expected efficiencies based upon all tokens used to sanction or reward having 
their expected effect. 
 There is little difference in allocative efficiency across decision situations.  
The opportunity to reward or sanction does not increase efficiency relative to the 
baseline VCM decision situation.  This result is to be expected considering that the 
opportunity to reward or sanction did little to affect average behavior within the 
VCM.  The overall efficiency level is highest in the baseline VCM decision situation 
(77.37%).  Overall efficiency in the uncertain sanction decision situation is less than 
in the baseline VCM decision situation even though VCM behavior is slightly more 
cooperative in the uncertain sanction decision situation.  This is because of the costs 
imposed by the use of sanctions.   
5. Conclusions 
 The fundamental difference between this study of this chapter and other VCM 
studies employing opportunities to reward or sanction is the one shot nature of the 
decision environment.  Previous studies have found that opportunities for rewards or 
sanctions can lead to more cooperative behavior within the VCM in repeated game 
environments.  This chapter finds that opportunities to reward and sanction in a one-
shot environment are not successful in increasing contributions in the VCM, even 
                                                 
16 There was no second stage in the baseline VCM decision situation.  For comparison purposes, the 
overall efficiency level for the baseline VCM decision situation is calculated by assuming that each 
subject was given the second stage endowment of green tokens. 
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though subjects do exhibit reciprocal behavior by sanctioning and rewarding other 
group members in a similar manner to that observed in other studies.17 
 One possible reason for the inability of these reciprocation opportunities to 
significantly increase contributions is that subjects do not believe it to be credible that  
others will reward or sanction and therefore they do not change their behavior within 
the VCM.  Another possible reason is that the sanction or reward a subject can expect 
to receive is too small to influence behavior within the VCM.   Chapter 3 examines 
this question by performing a similar study where the size of rewards and sanctions 
vary relative to their cost of imposition. 
 Little evidence is found to indicate that making the imposition of rewards or 
sanctions uncertain has any consistent implications relative to the case when 
imposition is certain.  Very similar results are found in the certain reward and 
uncertain reward decision situations; the same is true in the certain sanction and 
uncertain sanction decision situations.  In no case is it apparent that the decision rules 
of subjects are markedly different because of uncertainty in either the reward or the 
sanction decision situations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17 The opening round in a repeated VCM with rewards or sanctions would be similar to our one-shot 
environment, in the sense that in the opening round subjects have not been exposed to the second stage 
reward or sanction response of other subjects.  In Sefton, Shupp, and Walker (2001) average individual 
group account allocations in the opening rounds of treatments that allow sanctions or rewards are not 
significantly different from average allocations in the same round of the control treatment   
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Design Information 
 
 Number 
of 
Sessions 
Subjects 
per 
session 
Decision 
Situation 
1 
Decision 
Situation 
2 
Decision 
Situation 
3 
Decision 
Situation 
4 
Decision 
Situation 5 
First 
Ordering 
2 12 baseline 
VCM 
certain 
reward 
certain 
sanction 
uncertain 
reward 
uncertain 
sanction 
Second 
Ordering 
2 12 baseline 
VCM 
uncertain 
sanction 
uncertain 
reward 
certain 
sanction 
certain 
reward 
 
 
 
 
Table 2.  Mean Individual Group Account Allocations 
 
Mean Percentage of Tokens Allocated to Group Account 
 baseline 
VCM 
certain 
reward 
certain 
sanction 
uncertain 
reward 
uncertain 
sanction 
First 
Ordering 
51.67 
(41.35) 
51.67 
(39.74) 
55.00 
(35.87) 
51.25 
(39.60) 
56.67 
(35.10) 
Second 
Ordering 
55.00 
(39.23) 
44.17 
(38.89) 
49.17 
(39.22) 
49.17 
(38.67) 
54.58 
(34.26) 
Overall 53.33 
(39.91) 
47.91 
(39.08) 
52.08 
(37.30) 
50.21 
(38.73) 
55.63 
(34.33) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Prevalence of Sanctioning and Rewarding behavior 
 
Tokens Used to Reward or Sanction 
 certain    
reward 
certain   
sanction 
uncertain 
reward 
uncertain 
sanction 
average % of 
tokens per 
individual 
 
19.79 
 
20 
 
21.25 
 
20.42 
% of individual 
that use at least 
one token to  
sanction or 
reward  
 
35.41 
 
37.5 
 
43.75 
 
41.57 
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Table 4. Receipt of Rewards and Sanctions 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Tokens Received to Reward or Sanction  
Independent 
Variables 
Certain  
Reward 
Certain 
Sanction 
Uncertain 
Reward 
Uncertain 
Sanction 
Constant -0.722 
(1.044) 
-1.656 
(0.993) 
-0.002 
(1.259) 
-2.773 
(1.349) 
Other's Average 
Allocation 
0.192 
(0.174) 
0.224 
(0.160) 
0.179 
(0.196) 
0.118 
(0.191) 
Absolute 
Negative 
Deviation 
-0.582** 
(0.171) 
0.428** 
(0.163) 
-0.342* 
(0.194) 
0.932** 
(0.233) 
Absolute Positive 
Deviation 
0.270* 
(0.146) 
0.033 
(0.192) 
0.130 
(0.184) 
0.315 
(0.227) 
Notes: Tobit marginal effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.                                      
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Allocative Efficiency 
 
Total Subject Earnings as a Percentage of Maximum Possible Earnings 
 baseline 
VCM 
certain 
reward 
certain 
sanction 
uncertain 
reward 
uncertain 
sanction 
% of possible 
earnings from VCM 
only 
 
76.67 73.96 76.04 75.10 77.81 
% of possible 
earnings  from both 
VCM and reward or 
sanction stage 
         
78.79 
          
76.33 
          
74.58 
          
77.37 
 
76.12 
Note: For the uncertain cases, the second row lists expected efficiencies.  The overall 
efficiencies in the uncertain decision situations could be more or less depending upon 
the outcomes of the rewards and sanctions in those cases. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 1. Cumulate Distributions of Group Allocations in Each Decision Situation. 
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Figure 2.  Standard deviations of group account allocations of individual subjects 
across decision situations 
 
Standard Deviations of Group Account Allocations of 
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Note: Number on top of bar is the total number of subjects in the interval, there are 48 
total subjects. 
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Figure 3. Reward Tokens Received in Relation to Deviation from Other's Average 
Group Allocation  
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Number on top of bar is the total number of subjects in the interval, each 
decision situation has a total of 48 subjects. 
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Figure 4. Sanction Tokens Received in Relation to Deviation from Other's Average 
Group Allocation 
 
 
 
 
Note: Number on top of bar is the total number of subjects in the interval, each 
decision situation has a total of 48 subjects. 
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APPENDIX A - EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Presented below are the instructions and decision sheets for the second decision 
situations ordering of the experiment. 
 
Initial Instructions 
 
In this experiment, you will make choices in five different decision situations.  After 
the experiment is over, we will randomly pick one of the five decision situations for 
computing earnings. 
 
In each decision situation you will be randomly assigned into a group of four, you and 
3 other participants.  Therefore, you can expect the composition of your group to be 
different in each decision situation. 
 
Each decision situation except the first consists of two stages.  The first decision 
situation has no second stage. 
 
First, you will receive instructions for each decision situation separately, and then be 
given time to make your first stage choices in that situation.  After the first stage 
choices have been made in each decision situation, you will be given time to review 
and if you wish change any of the first stage choices that you made. 
 
We will then collect the decision sheets and prepare them for you to make your 
second stage choices in each of the final four decision situations.  We will again go 
through each situation one by one.  After the second stage choices have been made, 
you will be given time to review and if you wish change any of the second stage 
choices that you made. 
 
After all participants have had time to finalize their decisions, we will collect the 
decision sheets. 
 
We will randomly pick one of the five decision situations for computing earnings. 
 
Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of the participants that 
are in your group for the chosen decision situation. 
 
While we are calculating your earnings, you can earn a further $2 for completing a 
short, one page questionnaire. 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your $5 show-up fee, your earnings 
from the decision situation that is randomly selected, and your $2 for completing the 
questionnaire 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 1 
 
The instructions below describe the first decision situation and the way earnings will be 
determined if this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus 
three other people).  
 
In this decision situation, you will be endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must choose how 
many of these blue tokens to allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT and how many blue 
tokens to allocate to a GROUP ACCOUNT.   The amount of money you will earn in this 
decision situation depends on how many blue tokens you allocate to your private account, 
how many blue tokens you allocate to the group account, and how many blue tokens the 
others in your group allocate to the group account. 
 
You can choose any number of blue tokens to allocate to the group account from 0 through 
10 blue tokens.  The remainder of your blue tokens will be allocated to your private account.  
 
A blue token is worth $1 when allocated to your private account. 
 
For each blue token you allocate to the group account, you will earn 50 cents, and each of the 
other three people in your group will also earn 50 cents (a total of $2 for all four of you 
together). 
 
Each of the other participants in your group will also be endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
For each blue token another person in your group allocates to their private account, they also 
earn $1. 
 
For each blue token another person in your group allocates to the group account, this person 
will earn 50 cents, and each of the other people in the group, you included, will also earn 50 
cents (a total of $2 for the group). 
 
TO SUMMARIZE, in this decision situation you will earn: 
 
 $1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by  
             everyone in the group. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 1 Decision Sheet 
 
You have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of tokens you wish to allocate to the Group 
Account. Any remaining tokens will automatically be placed in your Private 
Account. 
 
How many of your ten blue tokens do you wish to allocate to the group 
account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 2 
 
The instructions below describe the second decision situation and the way earnings will be 
determined if this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus 
three other people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for 
all five decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the 
second stage.  They will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be 
completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision 
Situation 1. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in 
your group are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue 
tokens to allocate to the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many to allocate to your PRIVATE 
ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by  
             everyone in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 2 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to 
the group account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the 
individual group account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  
Information about individual choices will be completely anonymous, you will never know the 
identities of the other members of your group. 
   
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to 
your PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to decrease the Decision Situation 2 earnings of the 
other members of your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 2 
earnings by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to decrease the earnings of another group member in this decision 
situation, it will either decrease that group member’s Decision Situation 2 earnings by 40 
cents or leave that group member’s Decision Situation 2 earnings unchanged.  Both of these 
results are equally likely.  For each green token used to decrease another group member’s 
earnings, there will be a separate random draw to determine whether it decreases that group 
member’s earnings by 40 cents, or not at all. 
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You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 
green tokens, and any number to increase the earnings of each of the other group members, 
also any number from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you 
allocate to your private account and to increasing the earnings of other group members must 
sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the 
second stage, and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 2 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten blue tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________  in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to decrease that group member's Decision Situation 2 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Green Tokens to Decrease 
    by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                          ________     
 
 
                ________                                                          ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                          ________            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 3 
 
The instructions below describe the third decision situation and the way earnings will be 
determined if this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus 
three other people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for 
all five decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the 
second stage.  They will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be 
completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision 
Situation 1. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in 
your group are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue 
tokens to allocate to the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many to allocate to your PRIVATE 
ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by  
             everyone in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 3 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to 
the group account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the 
individual group account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  
Information about individual choices will be completely anonymous, you will never know the 
identities of the other members of your group. 
   
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to 
your PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to increase the Decision Situation 3 earnings of the 
other members of your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 3 
earnings by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to increase the earnings of another group member in this decision 
situation, it will either increase that group member’s Decision Situation 3 earnings by 40 
cents or leave that group member’s Decision Situation 3 earnings unchanged.  Both of these 
results are equally likely.  For each green token used to increase another group member’s 
earnings, there will be a separate random draw to determine whether it increases that group 
member’s earnings by 40 cents, or not at all. 
  
 32
You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 
green tokens, and any number to increase the earnings of each of the other group members, 
also any number from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you 
allocate to your private account and to increasing the earnings of other group members must 
sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the 
second stage, and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 3 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten blue tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________ in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to increase that group member's Decision Situation 3 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Green Tokens to Increase 
     by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                          ________     
 
 
                ________                                                          ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                          ________            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 4 
 
The instructions below describe the fourth decision situation and the way earnings will be determined 
if this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus three other 
people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for all five 
decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the second stage.  They 
will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision Situation 1. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in your group 
are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue tokens to allocate to 
the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by everyone  
               in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 4 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to the group 
account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the individual group 
account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  Information about individual choices 
will be completely anonymous, you will never know the identities of the other members of your group. 
  
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to your 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to decrease the Decision Situation 4 earnings of the other members of 
your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 4 earnings 
by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to decrease the earnings of another group member in this decision situation, it 
will decrease that member’s Decision Situation 4 earnings by 20 cents. 
 
You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 green 
tokens, and any number to decrease the earnings of each of the other group members, also any number 
from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you allocate to your private account 
and to decreasing the earnings of other group members must sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the second stage, 
and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 4 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten blue tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________  in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to decrease that group member's Decision Situation 4 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Tokens to Decrease 
    by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                             ________     
 
 
                ________                                                             ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                              ________            
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 5 
 
The instructions below describe the fifth decision situation and the way earnings will be determined if 
this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus three other 
people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for all five 
decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the second stage.  They 
will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision Situation 5. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in your group 
are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue tokens to allocate to 
the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many to allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by everyone  
              in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 5 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to the group 
account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the individual group 
account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  Information about individual choices 
will be completely anonymous, you will never know the identities of the other members of your group. 
  
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to your 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to increase the Decision Situation 5 earnings of the other members of 
your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 5 earnings 
by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to increase the earnings of another group member in this decision situation, it 
will increase that member’s Decision Situation 5 earnings by 20 cents. 
 
You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 green 
tokens, and any number to increase the earnings of each of the other group members, also any number 
from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you allocate to your private account 
and to increasing the earnings of other group members must sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the second stage, 
and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 5 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten blue tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________  in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to increase that group member's Decision Situation 5 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Green Tokens to Increase 
    by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                            ________     
 
 
                ________                                                            ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                            ________            
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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CHAPTER 2 - APPENDIX B - EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
 
Four experiments with twelve subjects took place, for a total of 48 subjects.  Within 
each experiment, the twelve subjects where placed into different random 4-person 
groups for each of the decision situations.  All data in terms of "blue" or "green" 
tokens used. 
 
1. Group Account Allocations in Each Decision Situation 
 
  Baseline 
VCM 
Certain 
Reward 
Certain 
Sanction 
Uncertain 
Reward 
Uncertain 
Sanction 
Subject 1 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 2 10 0 2 0 0 
Subject 3 10 9 7 10 8 
Subject 4 0 0 0 0 4 
Subject 5 10 6 7 6 7 
Subject 6 6 6 5 7 4 
Subject 7 5 7 4 6 2 
Subject 8 4 4 7 2 4 
Subject 9 2 3 1 2 1 
Subject 10 0 0 3 2 5 
Subject 11 10 10 10 10 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 12 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 13 7 8 3 5 5 
Subject 14 6 6 5 8 8 
Subject 15 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 16 4 10 10 8 8 
Subject 17 6 6 8 5 8 
Subject 18 0 0 7 0 5 
Subject 19 4 5 6 4 6 
Subject 20 0 0 1 0 2 
Subject 21 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 22 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 23 10 10 10 10 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 24 0 4 6 8 9 
Subject 25 9 6 5 6 5 
Subject 26 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 27 5 5 2 6 3 
Subject 28 0 0 0 0 2 
Subject 29 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 30 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 31 4 2 4 2 4 
Subject 32 3 0 5 3 2 
Subject 33 5 5 5 5 5 
Subject 34 0 2 3 2 3 
Subject 35 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 36 8 0 0 0 8 
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  Baseline 
VCM 
Certain 
Reward 
Certain 
Sanction 
Uncertain 
Reward 
Uncertain 
Sanction 
Subject 37 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 38 4 5 0 2 6 
Subject 39 5 6 4 5 4 
Subject 40 9 8 0 8 0 
Subject 41 8 8 8 8 10 
Subject 42 0 0 4 0 4 
Subject 43 10 0 10 0 10 
Subject 44 7 4 7 5 6 
Subject 45 0 9 9 10 8 
Subject 46 10 6 10 8 6 
Subject 47 10 10 10 10 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 48 5 0 2 8 5 
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2. Use of Sanctions and Rewards 
 
A. Certain Reward Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to reward each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received in reward from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
RG FGM 1: reward tokens used by subject to reward first fellow group member 
RR FGM 1: reward tokens used by first fellow group member to reward the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
RG FGM 2: reward tokens used by subject to reward second fellow group member 
RR FGM 2: reward tokens used by second fellow group member to reward the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
RG FGM 3: reward tokens used by subject to reward third fellow group member 
RR FGM 3: reward tokens used by third fellow group member to reward the subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 10 7 0 2 9 0 5 0 0 0 
Subject 
2 0 7 0 0 9 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
3 9 7 0 8 0 0 0 10 5 0 
Subject 
4 0 6 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
5 6 6 0 3 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Subject 
6 6 6 3 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 
Subject 
7 7 9 8 0 0 0 0 10 2 0 
Subject 
8 4 10 4 3 0 0 0 3 2 1 
Subject 
9 3 10 4 1 0 0 0 4 1 2 
Subject 
10 0 6 3 0 6 3 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
11 10 0 0 0 4 3 4 3 1 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 0 10 0 0 4 0 0 3 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 8 5 0 0 10 0 0 6 0 0 
Subject 
14 6 5 0 0 10 0 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
15 10 5 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
16 10 6 0 4 0 0 0 10 0 5 
Subject 
17 6 0 0 0 10 4 0 10 4 0 
Subject 
18 0 6 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
19 5 10 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
20 0 10 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
21 0 10 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
22 10 6 0 4 0 0 0 10 5 0 
Subject 
23 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 4 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
25 6 2 0 0 5 0 1 10 0 0 
Subject 
26 10 2 0 0 5 0 3 6 0 0 
Subject 
27 5 2 1 0 10 3 0 6 1 0 
Subject 
28 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
29 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
30 10 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
31 2 5 0 1 10 0 0 6 0 0 
Subject 
32 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
33 5 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
34 2 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 0 0 0 6 0 4 5 0 1 
Subject 
38 5 0 0 0 6 1 1 10 1 0 
Subject 
39 6 0 0 0 5 1 1 10 4 0 
Subject 
40 8 8 6 0 0 0 0 6 4 3 
Subject 
41 8 0 0 0 6 0 4 8 0 6 
Subject 
42 0 8 0 0 6 0 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
43 0 6 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
44 4 10 3 0 0 0 0 9 2 0 
Subject 
45 9 10 0 0 0 0 2 4 0 2 
Subject 
46 6 8 4 0 0 0 0 8 3 4 
Subject 
47 10 0 0 2 4 0 3 9 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 0 10 2 0 4 0 0 9 2 0 
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B. Certain Sanction Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to sanction each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received to sanction from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
SG FGM 1: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction first fellow group member 
SR FGM 1: sanction tokens used by first fellow group member to sanction the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
SG FGM 2: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction second fellow group member 
SR FGM 2: sanction tokens used by second fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
SG FGM 3: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction third fellow group member 
SR FGM 3: sanction tokens used by third fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 10 7 0 0 3 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
2 2 7 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Subject 
3 7 10 0 0 3 5 2 10 0 0 
Subject 
4 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 1 0 0 
Subject 
5 7 2 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Subject 
6 5 4 0 1 7 0 0 0 4 0 
Subject 
7 4 7 6 1 0 0 0 5 1 0 
Subject 
8 7 4 1 6 0 3 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
9 1 2 1 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
10 3 7 2 5 10 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
11 10 7 0 0 10 0 0 3 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 0 4 0 0 7 0 3 5 0 4 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 3 10 0 0 10 0 2 10 0 2 
Subject 
14 5 8 0 0 0 5 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
15 10 3 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 2 
Subject 
16 10 5 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
17 8 5 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
18 7 6 0 0 1 5 0 6 0 0 
Subject 
19 6 1 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 
Subject 
20 1 6 0 0 6 0 5 7 0 5 
Subject 
21 0 5 0 5 8 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
22 10 10 0 0 3 2 0 10 0 2 
Subject 
23 10 10 2 0 3 2 0 10 2 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 6 6 0 0 1 5 0 7 0 0 
Subject 
25 5 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
26 10 0 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
27 2 5 2 0 3 1 0 0 4 0 
Subject 
28 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
29 0 10 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
30 10 4 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
31 4 5 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
32 5 4 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
33 5 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
34 3 2 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
35 0 2 0 4 5 0 0 3 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 0 4 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 4 0 0 10 0 4 10 0 0 
Subject 
38 0 8 0 5 9 0 0 0 4 0 
Subject 
39 4 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 10 
Subject 
40 0 0 0 4 8 2 5 9 3 0 
Subject 
41 8 0 5 0 9 0 0 0 5 2 
Subject 
42 4 10 0 0 7 0 2 2 0 0 
Subject 
43 10 7 0 0 2 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
44 7 10 0 0 2 4 0 4 2 0 
Subject 
45 9 0 0 0 8 0 0 0 0 3 
Subject 
46 10 4 0 0 10 4 0 10 4 0 
Subject 
47 10 4 10 0 10 0 0 10 0 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 2 10 0 0 7 0 4 4 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 46
C. Uncertain Reward Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to reward each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received in reward from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
RG FGM 1: reward tokens used by subject to reward first fellow group member 
RR FGM 1: reward tokens used by first fellow group member to reward the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
RG FGM 2: reward tokens used by subject to reward second fellow group member 
RR FGM 2: reward tokens used by second fellow group member to reward the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
RG FGM 3: reward tokens used by subject to reward third fellow group member 
RR FGM 3: reward tokens used by third fellow group member to reward the subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 10 0 0 0 2 0 5 7 0 5 
Subject 
2 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 
Subject 
3 10 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
4 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
6 7 0 0 0 10 5 0 2 0 1 
Subject 
7 6 2 4 1 2 1 2 10 2 5 
Subject 
8 2 2 1 0 6 2 1 10 4 0 
Subject 
9 2 2 0 1 6 1 4 10 3 0 
Subject 
10 2 0 0 0 10 5 0 7 1 0 
Subject 
11 10 2 0 3 2 0 4 6 5 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 47
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 5 8 0 2 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
14 8 5 2 0 10 3 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
15 10 8 0 4 5 0 3 8 0 2 
Subject 
16 8 8 0 0 5 0 1 10 2 0 
Subject 
17 5 8 2 0 8 1 0 10 3 0 
Subject 
18 0 8 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
19 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 2 
Subject 
20 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 10 0 4 
Subject 
21 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 10 0 4 
Subject 
22 10 8 0 3 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
23 10 0 4 0 0 4 0 4 2 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 8 5 0 2 8 0 0 10 4 0 
Subject 
25 6 10 0 0 2 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
26 10 6 0 0 2 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
27 6 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Subject 
28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 1 
Subject 
29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 1 
Subject 
30 10 10 0 0 6 0 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
31 2 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
32 3 5 1 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
33 5 3 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
34 2 10 0 0 6 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
35 0 5 0 0 3 0 0 2 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 1 1 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 2 0 2 8 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
38 2 10 2 0 8 0 1 0 0 0 
Subject 
39 5 8 2 0 8 2 0 8 2 2 
Subject 
40 8 8 4 0 8 4 0 5 2 2 
Subject 
41 8 8 0 0 8 0 4 5 0 2 
Subject 
42 0 2 0 0 10 0 0 8 0 3 
Subject 
43 0 10 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
44 5 10 2 0 0 0 0 10 2 0 
Subject 
45 10 5 0 2 0 0 0 10 5 5 
Subject 
46 8 2 1 0 10 0 0 0 3 0 
Subject 
47 10 10 5 5 5 0 2 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 8 8 0 0 8 0 4 5 0 2 
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D. Uncertain Sanction Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to sanction each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received to sanction from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
SG FGM 1: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction first fellow group member 
SR FGM 1: sanction tokens used by first fellow group member to sanction the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
SG FGM 2: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction second fellow group member 
SR FGM 2: sanction tokens used by second fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
SG FGM 3: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction third fellow group member 
SR FGM 3: sanction tokens used by third fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 10 1 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
2 0 8 0 10 5 0 10 4 1 0 
Subject 
3 8 5 0 0 0 10 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
4 4 8 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
5 7 10 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 
Subject 
6 4 1 4 0 10 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
7 2 10 4 0 7 3 0 0 2 0 
Subject 
8 4 1 4 0 10 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
9 1 10 0 0 4 0 4 4 0 4 
Subject 
10 5 8 0 0 0 10 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
11 10 7 0 0 2 0 4 0 2 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 0 10 0 2 7 0 0 2 0 2 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 5 0 1 0 2 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
14 8 10 3 0 10 4 0 8 3 0 
Subject 
15 10 10 0 0 8 0 3 8 0 0 
Subject 
16 8 10 0 0 10 0 0 8 0 4 
Subject 
17 8 10 0 0 6 0 0 9 0 0 
Subject 
18 5 0 5 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
19 6 10 0 0 8 0 0 9 0 5 
Subject 
20 2 0 1 0 5 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
21 0 5 0 1 2 0 1 5 0 5 
Subject 
22 10 10 0 0 8 0 4 8 0 0 
Subject 
23 10 8 0 0 6 0 0 9 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 9 10 0 0 8 0 0 6 5 0 
Subject 
25 5 5 0 0 2 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
26 10 3 0 3 3 0 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
27 3 3 1 0 10 3 0 2 1 0 
Subject 
28 2 3 0 1 3 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
29 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 0 1 
Subject 
30 10 5 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
31 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
32 2 5 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
33 5 5 0 0 2 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
34 3 3 0 1 10 0 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
35 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 8 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 8 0 1 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 8 0 0 6 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
38 6 4 1 0 6 1 2 0 4 2 
Subject 
39 4 6 0 0 6 0 1 0 0 1 
Subject 
40 0 4 1 0 6 2 2 6 2 1 
Subject 
41 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 5 2 0 
Subject 
42 4 8 0 0 10 0 0 6 0 2 
Subject 
43 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
44 6 8 0 0 10 0 0 4 2 0 
Subject 
45 8 10 0 0 6 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
46 6 4 0 0 6 2 1 0 2 2 
Subject 
47 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 5 10 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 5 10 0 10 10 0 2 10 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 52
CHAPTER 3  
 
Comparing Rewards and Sanctions of Differing Size in a One-Shot Public Goods 
Setting  
 
1. Introduction 
 Chapter 2 examined rewards and sanctions in a strictly one-shot setting.  This 
experimental design prevented sanctions and rewards from being used for strategic 
purposes.  In the one-shot setting, the availability of rewards and sanctions simply 
made reciprocation opportunities more available.  Chapter 2 revealed that subjects are 
willing to reward and sanction other subjects at a personal cost when there is no 
repeated interaction.  However, reward and sanction opportunities did not enhance 
cooperation in the VCM relative to a one-shot VCM setting in which opportunities to 
reward or sanction do not exist.   
 A possible reason that sanctions and rewards where not effective in increasing 
cooperation in Chapter 2 is that the sanction or reward a subject could expect to 
receive was too small to influence behavior within the VCM.  This chapter attempts 
to address this question by examining rewards and sanctions that vary in relative size 
in relation to their cost of imposition.  The effect of these rewards and sanctions are 
examined in the same one-shot setting as Chapter 2 
 This chapter has many similarities to Gneezy (2003).  In that paper, rewards 
and sanctions of varying size are examined in a one-shot version of the proposer-
responder game originally used in Andreoni et. al. (2003).  Gneezy finds that 
opportunities for "small" rewards and sanctions actually tend to lower the amount that 
the proposer offers a responder.  Only when opportunities for "large" rewards and 
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sanctions are available are offers from the proposer increased relative to a dictator 
setting. 
 The experiments in this chapter use a design identical to the experiments in 
Chapter 2 except the decision situations involving uncertainty are replaced.  The 
experiments of this chapter instead include decision situations in which the effects of 
rewards or sanctions are increased relative to their cost.  The experimental design is 
presented in the next section.  Section 3 provides predictions based on available 
theory.  Section 4 presents the experimental results.  Section 5 contains concluding 
remarks. 
2. Experimental Design 
  The experiment consisted of four sessions conducted in the Spring of 2003.  
Twelve subjects recruited from introductory economics classes at Indiana University - 
Bloomington participated in each session.  The sessions took place in classrooms on 
campus.  Each session was conducted on paper with calculations being performed by 
the experimenters on computer terminals.  At the start of each session, subjects were 
presented with a packet that included initial instructions, separate instructions and 
decision sheets for each of five decision situations, and finally a questionnaire 
concerning general information about the subjects and the motivation of their 
decisions.18                      
The initial instructions informed the subjects of the general structure of the 
decision situations, and the following introductory information.  The subjects were 
informed that they would make choices in five separate decision situations, but only 
be compensated based on the outcome of one of the decision situations to be chosen 
                                                 
18 the instructions and decision sheets of the experiment are included in this chapter's appendix A. 
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randomly at the end of the experiment.19  They were also informed that they would be 
randomly assigned to a four-person group in each of the five decision situations.   
Finally, they were informed that in all but the first decision situation, there would be 
two stages.  And importantly, they were made aware that they would make their first 
stage decision in each decision situation and then the decision sheets would be 
collected and prepared for them to then make their second stage decisions in each 
decision situation.  The instructions were public.  The experimenter reviewed the 
initial instructions with the subjects, and each decision situation as the decision 
situations progressed.   
In the first stage of each of the five decision situations, the subjects 
participated in a VCM structured in the following way.  Each subject was endowed 
with 10 "blue" tokens to be allocated between his or her private account and the group 
account.20  For each blue token placed in his or her private account a subject received 
$1.  For each blue token placed in the group account, each group member received 50 
cents, a total of $2.00 for the 4-person group.   
Four of the five decision situations had a second stage. In the baseline VCM 
decision situation, there was no second stage.   In the other four decision situations 
subjects were informed of the aggregate allocation to the group account in the first 
stage, the allocation of each individual to the group account in the first stage, and 
their own first stage earnings.21  They then participated in a second stage in which 
                                                 
18 At the end of the experiment, a card was drawn from a set of five to determine which of the five 
decision situations would be used to determine earnings. 
19 The tokens were referred to as "blue" in the instructions to distinguish them from the "green" tokens 
that would be used for sanctioning and reward opportunities. 
20 Individual decisions were not linked to subject identifiers, subjects were never aware of the identities 
of the other members of their group. 
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subjects were endowed with 10 "green" tokens that could be used to reward or 
sanction the other subjects in their group based upon their first stage decisions.22  In 
the low reward decision situation, a green token could be used to increase the 
earnings of another group member by 20 cents.  In the low sanction decision 
situation, a green token could be used to lower the earnings of another group member 
by 20 cents.23  In the high reward decision situation, a green token could be used to 
increase the earnings of another group member by 40 cents.  In the high sanction 
decision situation, a green token could be used to decrease the earnings of another 
group member by 40 cents.   
In each decision situation, any green token not used to reward or sanction 
another group member was placed in a subject's private account where it earned 20 
cents.  In both the low reward and low sanction decision situations sanctioning or 
rewarding another subject requires that a subject incur a monetary cost equal to the 
size of the reward or sanction imposed on the receiver.  In the high reward and high 
sanction decision situations, the monetary cost to a subject of rewarding or 
sanctioning another subject is half as large as the monetary sanction or reward 
received by the receiver.  The subjects could use any number of green tokens to 
change another subject’s earnings, the only rule being that the total number of green 
tokens they used to change the earnings of their other three group members summed 
to 10 or less.   
                                                 
21 In the instructions, the words "reward" and "sanction" were never used.  The instructions referred to 
opportunities to increase or decrease the earnings of other group members. 
23 The baseline VCM, low reward, and low sanction decision situations are identical to the baseline 
VCM, certain reward, and certain sanction decision situations in Chapter 2. 
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This experimental design implies the following about the decision situations 
that allow opportunities to reward.  In the low reward decision situation, rewards 
constitute a zero-sum transfer from the subject giving the reward to the receiver of the 
reward.  In the high reward decision situation, the use of rewards is Pareto improving 
because each green token used to reward another subject increases the earnings of the 
receiver more than it decreases the earnings of the subject providing the reward.  One 
can view the second stage of the high reward decision situation as a repetition of the 
VCM environment of the first stage with caveats.  In the reward stage of the high 
reward decision situation, using a green token to reward another subject is similar to 
placing a token in the group account in the first stage except for the fact that the 
individual return of doing so is zero, and the reward is targeted to a specific group 
member.   
In both the low sanction and high sanction decision situations sanctioning 
reduces both the earnings of the subject imposing the sanction and the subject being 
sanctioned.  This implies that the use of sanctions in either case is inefficient from the 
point of view of total earnings.  This is most pronounced in the high sanction decision 
situation because of the magnified effect of sanctioning in that decision situation.    
The order of the decision situations was different in the final two sessions as 
opposed to the first two sessions.  Table 6 summarizes design information.  The 
decision situations were not referred to by name; they were called decision situation 
1, decision situation 2, etc.  At the end of the experiment, subjects privately received 
their earnings which included a $5 participation fee, their earnings from the one 
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decision situation that was randomly selected, and a further $2 fee for completing the 
end of experiment questionnaire.  
An important point about the previously described experimental structure 
deserves special mention.  The structure was intentionally chosen to keep each 
decision situation from being linked in any way to the other decision situations.  
Subjects were randomly placed in a different 4-person group for each decision 
situation.  Also, all first stage VCM decisions in each of the five decision situations 
were made before any second stage sanctioning or rewarding opportunities.  Finally, 
individuals never observed the sanctioning and rewarding behavior of other 
subjects.24 
3. Predictions 
 If one assumes that subjects make decisions to maximize own earnings, and 
that subjects expect others to do the same, the Nash equilibrium of the Baseline VCM 
decision situation is for all group account allocations to equal zero.  In the decision 
situations that allow rewards or sanctions, the equilibrium predictions are also 
straightforward.  In every case it cannot be equilibrium behavior to sanction or reward 
another group member if one is maximizing own earnings.  Subjects will never 
sanction or reward because doing so lowers own earnings.  Further, subjects playing 
the first stage VCM can expect to not be sanctioned or rewarded in the second stage, 
and will therefore choose a group account allocation of zero.  Therefore, the unique 
subgame perfect equilibria of the decision situations that allow rewards and sanctions 
involve zero allocations to the group account without any use of sanctions or rewards. 
                                                 
24 The experimental data is presented in this chapter's appendix B. 
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 However, as discussed in Chapter 2, outcomes in the VCM often do not 
conform to the Nash equilibrium prediction based upon own earnings maximization 
by subjects.  Subjects may be oriented toward reciprocity, and be willing to use the 
opportunity to reward or sanction to reciprocate the behavior of other group members 
in the first stage VCM.  If group members expect to be rewarded or sanctioned for 
their VCM choices, they may change their behavior so as to influence the sanction or 
reward they will receive.  If this is the case, we can expect VCM behavior to be more 
cooperative in the high reward and high sanction decision situations relative to the 
other 3 decision situations, because the size of the reward or sanction a subject would 
expect to receive in those decisions situations would be larger relative to the other 
decision situations for any given level of cooperative or uncooperative VCM 
behavior. 
4. Results 
4.1 Group Account Allocations 
Result 1.  Behavior in the baseline VCM decision situation is largely consistent with 
behavior in other VCM studies.  Subjects, on average, allocate about half of their 
endowment to the group account. 
 
 Table 7 reports mean group allocations in the baseline VCM decision 
situation.  Overall, subjects allocate 5.77, or 57.7% of their tokens to the group 
account on average.  This is generally consistent with other studies that share a 
marginal per-capita return from the group account of 0.5.25  For example, in Chapter 
2, a study using a structure identical to this one, subjects contributed 53.3% of their 
tokens to the group account.  Figure 5 displays the cumulative distribution of 
                                                 
25 In Sefton, Shupp, and Walker (2001) subjects allocate 53% of their endowment to the group account 
in the first round.  In Swope (2000), they allocate 45%. 
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individual contributions in the baseline VCM decision situation.  There is a large 
variation in individual behavior.  A third of subjects choose to contribute their entire 
endowment to the group account, this is the most common individual choice. 
Result 2.  Group account allocations in the low reward and the low sanction decision 
situations are not significantly changed relative to group account allocations in the 
baseline VCM decision situation. 
  
 Table 7 reports mean group account allocations in the low reward and the low 
sanction decision situations.  The overall mean group allocation is slightly lower in 
the low reward decision situation that in the baseline VCM decision.  The overall 
mean group allocation is slightly higher in the low sanction decision situation than in 
the baseline VCM decision situation.  Table 8 presents non-parametric matched pairs 
Mann-Whitney tests comparing group allocations in the low reward and low sanction 
decision situations to group allocations in the baseline VCM decision situation.  In 
neither case is the difference statistically significant.  This result is consistent with the 
results in Chapter 2. 
 Figure 5 displays the cumulative distributions of individual group allocations 
of subjects in the low reward and the low sanction decision situations.  Graphically 
the distributions are quite similar to the distribution of group allocations in the 
baseline VCM decision situation.    
Result 3. Group account allocations in the high reward decision situation are not  
significantly increased relative to group account allocations in the baseline VCM 
decision situation. 
 
Table 7 reports mean group account allocations in the high reward decision situation.  
The overall mean group allocation is slightly higher in the high reward decision 
situation that in the baseline VCM decision.  Table 8 presents a matched pairs Mann-
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Whitney test comparing group allocations in the high reward decision situations to 
group allocations in the baseline VCM decision situation.  The difference is not 
statistically significant. 
 Figure 5 displays the cumulative distribution of individual group allocations in 
the high reward decision situation. The distribution is visually very similar to the 
distribution of individual group allocations in the baseline VCM decision situation. 
Result 4.  Group account allocations are significantly increased in the high sanction 
decision situation relative to group account allocations in the baseline VCM decision 
situation. 
 
 Table 7 displays mean group allocations in the high sanction decision 
situation.  The mean group allocation in the high sanction decision situation is 0.83 
tokens higher than the mean group allocation in the baseline VCM decision situation.  
This difference is significant at the 5% level according to the matched-pairs Mann-
Whitney test shown in Table 8.  Figure 5 displays the cumulative distribution of 
individual group allocations in the high sanction decision situation.  A larger 
percentage of subjects have comparatively high group account allocations in the high 
sanction decision situation than in any of the other decision situations.    
 Further evidence for Result 4 is provided by Table 9 which provides 
comparisons of individual behavior between the decision situations that allow 
sanctions or rewards and the baseline VCM decision situation.  In the high sanction 
decision situation a third of subjects have a group allocation that exceeds their group 
allocation in the baseline VCM decision situation, while only 14.38 percent of 
subjects have a lower group allocation than in the baseline VCM.  Also, the subjects 
that increase their group allocations above their group allocations in the baseline 
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VCM tend do so by the greatest amount compared to other decision situations.  It 
appears that the threat of possible sanctions in the high sanction decision situation is 
powerful enough to encourage a large enough number of subjects to adjust their 
behavior in a more cooperative direction relative to their behavior in the baseline 
VCM.  This does not appear to be the case in the low sanction decision situation.  
Similarly, in the decision situations that allow rewards, possible rewards do not 
appear powerful enough to encourage a sufficient number of subjects to increase their 
group allocations relative to the baseline VCM decision situation. 
Result 5. Large variations across decisions situations in the group account allocations                     
of individual subjects are rare. 
 
 The average standard deviation of group account allocations across the five 
decision situations for individual subjects is 1.07 tokens.  Figure 6 displays the 
standard deviation of group account allocations in the five decision situations for each 
subject.  More than 72% of subjects have a standard deviation less than 2. 
4.2 The Use of Sanctions and Reward 
 
Result 6. Subjects use sanctions and rewards in all four decision situations that allow 
sanctions or rewards.  Rewarding is more common overall than sanctioning.  The use 
of rewards is very pronounced in the high reward decision situation. 
 
 Table 10 lists the average percentage of second stage token endowments that 
are used to reward or sanction in the four decision situations in which rewarding and 
sanctioning are possible.  The use of second stage tokens is least prevalent in the high 
sanction decision situation.  The use of second stage tokens is most prevalent in the 
high reward decision situation.  About one third of second stage token endowments 
are used to reward in the high reward decision situation, and about two thirds of 
subjects use at least one token to reward other subjects.  This indicates that subjects 
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respond to the Pareto improving nature of the rewards in the high reward decision 
situation.   
Result 7. In the reward decision situations, a subject tends to receive a larger reward 
the larger is his or her group allocation relative to the average group allocation of 
other group members. 
  
General support for Result 7 is provided by Figure 7.  Figure 7 shows the 
average number of reward tokens received as a function of an individual's deviation 
from the average group allocation of other group members for both the certain 
reward and the uncertain reward decision situations.  In Figure 7 it is apparent that 
those that make group allocations above the average of other group members receive 
larger awards than those that do not.  This result is much more pronounced in the high 
reward decision situation.   
 Just as in Chapter 2, a regression model is estimated to provide more formal 
evidence of Result 7.  A Tobit specification is used with total reward tokens received 
by a subject as the dependent variable.  The independent variables are: 1) the average 
contribution of other group members, 2) the subject's absolute negative deviation 
from the average contribution of others, and 3) the subject's absolute positive 
deviation from the average contribution of others.26  For Result 7 to hold, a negative 
deviation should lower one's reward, and a positive deviation should increase one's 
reward.  Table 11 provides results.  In both the low reward and high reward decision 
situations, "absolute negative deviation" and "absolute positive deviation" have the 
expected signs.  "Absolute positive deviation" is not statistically significant in the 
case of the low reward decision situation.  In both cases "other's average allocation" 
                                                 
25 If the average allocation of other group members is Xbar, and a subject's individual allocation is X, 
absolute negative deviation is defined as max { 0,  Xbar - X } and absolute positive deviation is 
defined as max { 0, X - Xbar }. 
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has a positive sign meaning that groups with a large average group allocation tend to 
reward more, "other's average allocation" is not statistically significant in the low 
reward decision situation. 
Result 8. In the sanction decision situations, a subject tends to receive a larger 
sanction the smaller is his or her group allocation relative to the average group 
allocation of other group members. 
 
 Support for Result 8 is provided by Figure 8.  Figure 8 shows the number of 
tokens used to sanction a subject as a function of the subject's deviation from the 
average contribution of other group members for both the low sanction and the high 
sanction decision situation.  In both cases subjects with group allocations below the 
average allocation of others receive the majority of the sanctions. A similar regression 
to that used in the case of rewards is performed for the sanctioning decision 
situations.  As shown in Table 11, in both the low sanction and high sanction decision 
situations "absolute negative deviation" is positive and statistically significant.   
Result 9.  In general, subjects tend to reward or sanction others more the higher is 
their own group account allocation.  They tend to reward more the higher is the 
average contribution of other subjects in there group.  They tend sanction more the 
lower is the average contribution of other subjects. 
 
 Table 12 displays the results of Tobit regressions.  The dependent variable is 
the total number of tokens a subject uses to reward or sanction other subjects.  The 
independent variables are: 1) the subjects own group account allocation, and 2) the 
average group allocation of the other subjects in the subject's group.  In all cases, 
except the low reward decision situation, the coefficient on "Own Allocation" is 
positive meaning that subjects tend to sanction and reward more the higher is their 
own contribution.  The coefficient is only statistically significant in the case of the 
low sanction decision situation.  The coefficient on "Other's Average Allocation" has 
 64
the expected sign in all cases, it is positive in the reward decision situations, and 
negative in the sanction decision situations.  In no case is "Other's Average 
Allocation" statistically significant. 
4.3 Efficiency 
Result 10.  Overall Efficiency levels are similar across decision situations  
  
 Define efficiency as total subject earnings as a percentage of maximum 
possible subject earnings.  Table 13 provides efficiency results for all five decision 
situations.  It includes efficiency percentages for earnings just from the first stage 
VCM, and also overall efficiencies for the entire two stage game.27   
 The overall efficiency level is higher in the baseline VCM decision situation 
than in either the low sanction or the high sanction decision situations even though 
VCM behavior is more cooperative in the sanctioning decision situations.  This is 
because of the costs imposed by the use of sanctions.  Anytime a sanction is imposed, 
efficiency must fall because sanctioning imposes a cost on the subject imposing the 
sanction, as well on the recipient of the sanction.  This is most pronounced in the high 
sanction decision situation because the cost imposed by sanctions is highest in that 
case.  Overall efficiencies are the highest in the high reward decision situation, 
because of the Pareto improving nature of rewards in that decision situation.28 
 
 
                                                 
26 There was no second stage in the baseline VCM decision situation.  For comparison purposes, the 
overall efficiency level for the baseline VCM decision situation is calculated by assuming that each 
subject was given the second stage endowment of green tokens. 
28 In the case of the high reward decision situation maximum possible earnings are assumed not to 
include the possible earnings that immediately accrue whenever a reward is imposed.  If those earnings 
are included in maximum possible earnings, the two stage efficiency is 78.72%. 
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5. Conclusions 
 Chapter 2 found that sanctioning and rewarding opportunities are ineffective 
in facilitating cooperation in a one-shot VCM setting.  This chapter was designed to 
examine whether this result may have been due to the fact that the sanction or reward 
a subject could expect to receive may have been too small to influence VCM 
behavior.  The results of this chapter are largely consistent with the results of Chapter 
2.  Results in the low reward and low sanction decision situations are consistent with 
results in the identical certain reward and certain sanction decision situations 
Chapter 2.  There is no evidence that expanding the opportunity to reward as is done 
in the high reward decision situation increases group cooperation relative to the 
baseline VCM decision situation.  However, it is interesting that in that decision 
situation the use of rewards is expanded. 
 The most interesting result of this chapter is that cooperation within the VCM 
is expanded in the high sanction decision situation.  This indicates that at least some 
additional cooperation can be encouraged by sanctioning opportunities within a one-
shot VCM setting.  It would be interesting to see the effect of expanding sanctioning 
opportunities even more relative to their cost of imposition. 
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Tables 
Table 6. Design Information 
 
 Number of 
Sessions 
Subjects 
per session 
Decision 
Situation 1 
Decision 
Situation 2 
Decision 
Situation 3 
Decision 
Situation 4 
Decision 
Situation 5 
First 
Ordering 
2 12 baseline 
VCM 
low 
reward 
low 
sanction 
high 
reward 
high 
sanction 
Second 
Ordering 
2 12 baseline 
VCM 
high 
sanction 
high 
reward 
low 
sanction 
low 
reward 
 
 
 
  
Table 7.  Mean Group Account Allocations in First Stage VCM 
 
Mean Allocations to Group Account 
 baseline 
VCM 
low    
reward 
low  
sanction 
high   
reward 
high 
sanction 
First 
Ordering 
5.00 
(4.04) 
5.04 
(3.86) 
5.04 
(3.71) 
5.58 
(3.60) 
5.88 
(3.60) 
Second 
Ordering 
6.54 
(3.54) 
6.21 
(4.26) 
7.08 
(3.42) 
6.92 
(3.62) 
7.33 
(3.13) 
Overall 5.77 
(3.84) 
5.63 
(4.06) 
6.06 
(3.68) 
6.25 
(3.64) 
6.60 
(3.42) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard deviations.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8. Tests Comparing Mean Group Account Contributions to Mean Group 
Account Contributions in Baseline VCM Decision Situation. 
 
 Mann-Whitney Matched Pairs Test 
 p-value 
low reward 0.455 
low sanction 0.325 
high reward  0.126 
high sanction 0.031** 
** denotes significance at 95% level. 
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Table 9. Differences in Individual Group Account Allocation in Relation to 
Individual Group Allocation in Baseline VCM Decision Situation. 
 
 Higher group 
allocation 
than baseline 
VCM   (% of 
subjects) 
Average 
Difference 
(number of 
tokens) 
Average 
Contribution 
in Baseline 
VCM  
(number of 
Tokens) 
Lower group 
allocation 
than 
baseline 
VCM   (% 
of subjects) 
Average 
Difference 
(number of 
tokens) 
Average 
Contribution 
in Baseline 
VCM 
(number of 
tokens) 
low 
reward 18.75 1.89 5.11 25.00 -2.00 5.17 
low 
sanction 37.50 2.17 3.39 22.91 -2.27 5.45 
high 
reward 31.25 2.53 4.00 18.75 -1.66 5.22 
high 
sanction 33.33 3.75 2.69 14.58 -2.86 5.86 
 
low 
reward 
Same group 
allocation as 
baseline 
VCM 
(% of 
subjects) 
Average 
Contribution 
in Baseline 
VCM 
(number of 
tokens)  
low 
reward 56.25 6.26 
low 
sanction 39.58 8.21 
high 
reward 50.00 7.08 
high 
sanction 52.08 7.72 
 
 
 
Table 10.  Prevalence of Sanctioning and Rewarding behavior 
 
Tokens Used to Reward or Sanction 
 low         
reward 
low       
sanction 
high        
reward 
high      
sanction 
average % of 
tokens per 
individual 
 
22.92 
 
16.04 
 
32.08 
 
14.36 
% of individuals 
that use at least 
one token to  
sanction or 
reward  
 
45.83 
 
37.5 
 
62.50 
 
29.17 
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Table 11.  Receipt of Rewards and Sanctions 
 
Dependent Variable: Tokens Received to Reward or Sanction 
Independent Variables Low       
Reward 
Low      
Sanction 
High      
Reward 
High    
Sanction 
Constant 1.028 
(0.872) 
-2.380* 
(1.227) 
-0.629 
(1.608) 
-3.365** 
(1.709) 
Other's Average 
Allocation 
0.109 
(0.109) 
0.275 
(0.178) 
0.377* 
(0.223) 
0.230 
(0.203) 
Absolute Negative 
Deviation 
-0.734*** 
(0.173) 
0.352*** 
(0.167) 
-0.584** 
(0.198) 
0.364** 
(0.184) 
Absolute Positive 
Deviation 
0.175 
(0.154) 
-0.047 
(0.361) 
0.969*** 
(0.178) 
0.167 
(0.247) 
Notes: Tobit marginal effects.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  * denotes 
significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** denotes 
significance at 1% level 
 
 
 
 
Table 12.  Determinates of the giving of Rewards and Sanctions 
 
Dependent Variable: Total Number of Tokens Used to Reward or Sanction other 
Subjects 
Independent 
Variables 
Low       
Reward 
Low       
Sanction 
High      
Reward 
High     
Sanction 
Constant -1.786 
(2.316) 
-4.403 
(3.781) 
0.173 
(3.149) 
-2.715 
(4.283) 
Own 
Contribution 
-0.039 
(0.244) 
0.619** 
(0.270) 
0.072 
(0.206) 
0.123 
(0.389) 
Other's Average 
Contribution 
0.316  
(0.347)         
-0.142 
(0.457) 
0.225 
(0.405) 
-0.240 
(0.557) 
Notes: Tobit maximum likelihood estimates.  Standard errors are in parentheses.          
* denotes significance at 10% level, ** denotes significance at 5% level, *** 
denotes significance at 1% level 
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Table 13. Allocative Efficiency 
 
Total Subject Earnings as a Percentage of Maximum Possible Earnings 
 baseline 
VCM 
low 
reward 
low 
sanction 
high 
reward 
high      
sanction 
% of possible 
earnings from VCM 
only 
78.85 78.13 80.31 81.25 83.02 
% of possible 
earnings  from both 
VCM and reward or 
sanction stage 
         
80.78 
          
80.11 
          
79.18 
          
78.72 
 
80.64 
Note: In the case of the high reward decision situation maximum possible earnings 
are calculated assuming that all tokens are used to reward, this increases maximum 
possible earnings above the other decision situations. 
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Figures 
 
Figure 5. Cumulate Distributions of Group Allocations in Each Decision Situation. 
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Figure 6. Standard Deviations of Group Account Allocations of Individual Subjects 
Across Decision Situations 
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Note: Number on top of bar is the total number of subjects in the interval, each 
decision situation has a total of 48 subjects. 
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Figure 7. Reward Tokens Received in Relation to Deviation from Other's Average 
Group Allocation 
 
 
 
Reward Tokens Received in Relation to Deviation 
from Other's Average Group Allocation
18
18
14
3
4
16
15
6
3
8
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
[-10,-6) [-6,-2) [-2, 2] (2,6] (6,10]
Deviation from Average Group Allocation of 
Other Group Members
A
ve
ra
ge
 R
ew
ar
d 
To
ke
ns
 R
ec
ei
ve
d
Low Reward
High Reward
 
 
Note: Number on top of bar is the total number of subjects in the interval, each 
decision situation has a total of 48 subjects. 
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Figure 8. Sanction Tokens Received in Relation to Deviation from Other's Average  
Group Allocation 
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Note: Number on top of bar is the total number of subjects in the interval, each 
decision situation has a total of 48 subjects. 
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CHAPTER 3 - APPENDIX A - EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Presented below are the instructions and decision sheets for the second decision 
situations ordering of the experiment. 
 
Initial Instructions 
 
In this experiment, you will make choices in five different decision situations.  After the 
experiment is over, we will randomly pick one of the five decision situations for computing 
earnings. 
 
In each decision situation you will be randomly assigned into a group of four, you and 3 other 
participants.  Therefore, you can expect the composition of your group to be different in each 
decision situation. 
 
Each decision situation except the first consists of two stages.  The first decision situation has 
no second stage. 
 
First, you will receive instructions for each decision situation separately, and then be given 
time to make your first stage choices in that situation.  After the first stage choices have been 
made in each decision situation, you will be given time to review and if you wish change any 
of the first stage choices that you made. 
 
We will then collect the decision sheets and prepare them for you to make your second stage 
choices in each of the final four decision situations.  We will again go through each situation 
one by one.  After the second stage choices have been made, you will be given time to review 
and if you wish change any of the second stage choices that you made. 
 
After all participants have had time to finalize their decisions, we will collect the decision 
sheets. 
 
We will randomly pick one of the five decision situations for computing earnings. 
 
Your earnings will depend on your decisions and the decisions of the participants that are in 
your group for the chosen decision situation. 
 
While we are calculating your earnings, you can earn a further $2 for completing a short, one 
page questionnaire. 
 
At the end of the experiment, you will receive your $5 show-up fee, your earnings from the 
decision situation that is randomly selected, and your $2 for completing the questionnaire. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 1 
 
The instructions below describe the first decision situation and the way earnings will be 
determined if this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus 
three other people).  
 
In this decision situation, you will be endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must choose how 
many of these blue tokens to allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT and how many blue 
tokens to allocate to a GROUP ACCOUNT.   The amount of money you will earn in this 
decision situation depends on how many blue tokens you allocate to your private account, 
how many blue tokens you allocate to the group account, and how many blue tokens the 
others in your group allocate to the group account. 
 
You can choose any number of blue tokens to allocate to the group account from 0 through 
10 blue tokens.  The remainder of your blue tokens will be allocated to your private account.  
 
A blue token is worth $1 when allocated to your private account. 
 
For each blue token you allocate to the group account, you will earn 50 cents, and each of the 
other three people in your group will also earn 50 cents (a total of $2 for all four of you 
together). 
 
Each of the other participants in your group will also be endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
For each blue token another person in your group allocates to their private account, they also 
earn $1. 
 
For each blue token another person in your group allocates to the group account, this person 
will earn 50 cents, and each of the other people in the group, you included, will also earn 50 
cents (a total of $2 for the group). 
 
TO SUMMARIZE, in this decision situation you will earn: 
 
 $1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by  
             everyone in the group. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 1 Decision Sheet 
 
You have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. Any 
remaining tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 2 
 
The instructions below describe the second decision situation and the way earnings will be determined 
if this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus three other 
people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for all five 
decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the second stage.  They 
will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision Situation 1. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in your group 
are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue tokens to allocate to 
the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many to allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by everyone  
               in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 2 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to the group 
account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the individual group 
account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  Information about individual choices 
will be completely anonymous, you will never know the identities of the other members of your group. 
   
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to your 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to decrease the Decision Situation 2 earnings of the other members of 
your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 2 earnings 
by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to decrease the earnings of another group member in this decision situation, it 
will decrease that group member’s Decision Situation 2 earnings by 40 cents . 
  
You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 green 
tokens, and any number to increase the earnings of each of the other group members, also any number 
from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you allocate to your private account 
and to increasing the earnings of other group members must sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the second stage, 
and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 2 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________  in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to decrease that group member's Decision Situation 2 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Tokens to Decrease 
   by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                          ________     
 
 
                ________                                                          ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                          ________            
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 3 
 
The instructions below describe the third decision situation and the way earnings will be determined if 
this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus three other 
people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for all five 
decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the second stage.  They 
will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision Situation 1. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in your group 
are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue tokens to allocate to 
the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many to allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by everyone  
               in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 3 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to the group 
account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the individual group 
account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  Information about individual choices 
will be completely anonymous, you will never know the identities of the other members of your group. 
   
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to your 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to increase the Decision Situation 3 earnings of the other members of 
your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 3 earnings 
by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to increase the earnings of another group member in this decision situation, it 
will either increase that group member’s Decision Situation 3 earnings by 40 cents.  
  
You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 green 
tokens, and any number to increase the earnings of each of the other group members, also any number 
from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you allocate to your private account 
and to increasing the earnings of other group members must sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the second stage, 
and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 3 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________ in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to increase that group member's Decision Situation 3 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Tokens to Increase 
   by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                          ________     
 
 
                ________                                                          ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                          ________            
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 4 
 
The instructions below describe the forth decision situation and the way earnings will be determined if 
this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus three other 
people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for all five 
decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the second stage.  They 
will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision Situation 1. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in your group 
are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue tokens to allocate to 
the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many to allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by everyone  
               in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 4 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to the group 
account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the individual group 
account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  Information about individual choices 
will be completely anonymous, you will never know the identities of the other members of your group. 
  
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to your 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to decrease the Decision Situation 4 earnings of the other members of 
your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 4 earnings 
by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to decrease the earnings of another group member in this decision situation, it 
will decrease that member’s Decision Situation 4 earnings by 20 cents. 
 
You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 green 
tokens, and any number to decrease the earnings of each of the other group members, also any number 
from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you allocate to your private account 
and to decreasing the earnings of other group members must sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the second stage, 
and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 4 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________  in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to decrease that group member's Decision Situation 4 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Tokens to Decrease 
   by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                             ________     
 
 
                ________                                                             ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                              ________            
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Instructions for Decision Situation 5 
 
The instructions below describe the fifth decision situation and the way earnings will be determined if 
this decision situation is the one that is randomly selected. 
 
For this decision situation you will be randomly assigned to a group of size four (you plus three other 
people).   
 
This decision situation consists of two stages.  When you have completed the first stage for all five 
decision situations, we will collect your decision sheets and prepare them for the second stage.  They 
will then be returned to you so that the second stage decisions can be completed. 
 
The First Stage 
 
In the first stage, the decision you will make is just like the decision you made in Decision Situation 1. 
 
In the first stage you are endowed with 10 blue tokens, and the other three participants in your group 
are also endowed with 10 blue tokens.  You must decide how many of these blue tokens to allocate to 
the GROUP ACCOUNT, and how many to allocate to your PRIVATE ACCOUNT. 
 
In the first stage you will earn: 
 
$1 times the number of blue tokens you allocate to your private account PLUS 
 $0.50 times the total number of blue tokens allocated to the group account by everyone  
              in the group. 
 
The Second Stage 
 
On your Decision Situation 5 decision sheet, you will be informed of the total allocation to the group 
account and your total earnings for the first stage.  You will also be informed of the individual group 
account allocation decisions of the other members of your group.  Information about individual choices 
will be completely anonymous, you will never know the identities of the other members of your group. 
  
In the 2nd stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens.  A green token can be allocated to your 
PRIVATE ACCOUNT, or used to increase the Decision Situation 5 earnings of the other members of 
your group. 
 
If you allocate a green token to your private account it will increase your Decision Situation 5 earnings 
by 20 cents. 
 
If you use a green token to increase the earnings of another group member in this decision situation, it 
will increase that member’s Decision Situation 5 earnings by 20 cents. 
 
You can choose any number of green tokens to allocate to your private account, from 0 to 10 green 
tokens, and any number to increase the earnings of each of the other group members, also any number 
from 0 to 10 green tokens.  However, the number of green tokens you allocate to your private account 
and to increasing the earnings of other group members must sum to 10. 
 
The other three members of your group will also be endowed with 10 green tokens in the second stage, 
and will be able to use them in the same way. 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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Decision Situation 5 Decision Sheet 
 
First Stage 
 
In the first stage you have been endowed with 10 blue tokens. 
 
In the box below, enter the amount of blue tokens you wish to allocate to the Group Account. 
Any remaining blue tokens will automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
How many of your ten tokens do you wish to allocate to the group account?   
 
Write a number from 0 to 10 here.   _________ 
 
 
 
 
Second Stage 
 
 
_____ blue tokens where allocated to the group account by your group in the first stage.   
 
You earned  ___________  in the first stage. 
 
In this stage you are endowed with 10 green tokens. 
 
The first column of each row below shows how many blue tokens another group member 
allocated to the Group Account in the first stage.  In the column to the right, enter the number 
of green tokens you wish to use to increase that group member's Decision Situation 5 
earnings. You may enter any number from 0 to 10 for each group member below, but all the 
numbers you enter must add up to 10 OR LESS.  Any remaining green tokens will 
automatically be placed in your Private Account. 
 
    
    Allocations to Group Account                     Number of Tokens to Increase 
   by Other Group Members                            this Member's Earnings 
 
                ________                                                            ________     
 
 
                ________                                                            ________ 
 
 
                ________                                                            ________            
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are participant _______ for all decision situations. 
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CHAPTER 3 - APPENDIX B - EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
 
Four experiments with twelve subjects took place, for a total of 48 subjects.  Within 
each experiment, the twelve subjects where placed into different random 4-person 
groups for each of the decision situations.  All data in terms of "blue" or "green" 
tokens used. 
 
 
1. Group Account Allocations in Each Decision Situation 
 
  Baseline 
VCM 
Low 
Reward 
Low 
Sanction 
High 
Reward 
High 
Sanction 
Subject 1 10 7 8 10 10 
Subject 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 3 2 2 2 2 2 
Subject 4 10 9 8 8 8 
Subject 5 1 3 6 3 6 
Subject 6 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 7 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 8 3 5 0 6 7 
Subject 9 0 0 4 0 8 
Subject 10 3 3 4 5 4 
Subject 11 3 3 4 3 8 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 12 5 7 6 4 4 
Subject 13 2 2 0 2 2 
Subject 14 1 2 3 8 4 
Subject 15 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 16 6 4 4 4 4 
Subject 17 5 9 4 7 7 
Subject 18 7 3 0 4 0 
Subject 19 2 2 3 3 2 
Subject 20 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 21 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 22 0 0 5 5 5 
Subject 23 10 10 10 10 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 24 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 25 0 0 1 0 5 
Subject 26 2 0 4 0 6 
Subject 27 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 28 2 0 4 1 3 
Subject 29 9 10 10 10 9 
Subject 30 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 31 7 8 8 8 9 
Subject 32 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 33 7 9 9 8 7 
Subject 34 9 9 9 9 9 
Subject 35 0 0 4 5 7 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 36 5 3 5 3 8 
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  Baseline 
VCM 
Low 
Reward 
Low 
Sanction 
High 
Reward 
High 
Sanction 
Subject 37 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 38 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 39 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 40 8 10 10 10 10 
Subject 41 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 42 4 3 3 4 4 
Subject 43 8 8 10 10 8 
Subject 44 4 3 2 5 0 
Subject 45 2 0 0 5 0 
Subject 46 10 10 10 10 10 
Subject 47 7 5 6 6 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 48 3 1 5 2 6 
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2. Use of Sanctions and Rewards 
 
A. Low Reward Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to reward each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received in reward from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
RG FGM 1: reward tokens used by subject to reward first fellow group member 
RR FGM 1: reward tokens used by first fellow group member to reward the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
RG FGM 2: reward tokens used by subject to reward second fellow group member 
RR FGM 2: reward tokens used by second fellow group member to reward the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
RG FGM 3: reward tokens used by subject to reward third fellow group member 
RR FGM 3: reward tokens used by third fellow group member to reward the subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 7 10 1 0 2 0 3 0 0 0 
Subject 
2 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 
Subject 
3 2 10 2 0 0 0 0 7 3 0 
Subject 
4 9 3 0 2 10 0 0 3 0 5 
Subject 
5 3 10 3 0 3 0 0 9 2 0 
Subject 
6 10 3 0 3 3 0 5 9 0 0 
Subject 
7 10 2 0 2 0 0 0 7 0 1 
Subject 
8 5 3 1 2 7 3 1 0 0 0 
Subject 
9 0 3 0 0 7 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
10 3 3 0 0 10 5 0 9 5 0 
Subject 
11 3 7 3 1 5 2 1 0 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 7 3 1 3 5 1 3 0 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 
Subject 
14 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Subject 
15 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
16 4 9 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
17 9 3 2 0 0 2 0 4 2 0 
Subject 
18 3 9 0 2 0 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
19 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 2 0 2 
Subject 
20 10 10 0 0 10 0 1 10 0 0 
Subject 
21 10 10 0 0 10 0 1 10 0 0 
Subject 
22 0 9 0 2 3 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
23 10 10 0 1 10 0 0 10 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 10 10 1 0 10 1 0 10 1 0 
Subject 
25 0 8 8 0 10 1 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
26 0 8 0 0 10 2 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
27 10 8 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 
Subject 
28 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 
Subject 
29 10 10 3 0 9 3 5 0 0 0 
Subject 
30 10 10 0 3 9 0 5 0 0 0 
Subject 
31 8 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 
Subject 
32 10 0 0 0 3 0 0 9 1 0 
Subject 
33 9 0 0 0 3 0 0 10 0 1 
Subject 
34 9 10 5 3 10 5 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
35 0 3 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 3 0 0 0 10 0 0 9 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 8 0 1 10 0 2 10 0 4 
Subject 
38 10 8 2 1 10 4 2 10 4 0 
Subject 
39 10 8 1 1 10 2 4 10 2 0 
Subject 
40 10 10 3 0 3 0 1 10 3 0 
Subject 
41 10 3 0 2 10 0 0 10 0 3 
Subject 
42 3 10 2 0 10 2 0 10 1 0 
Subject 
43 8 10 1 1 10 1 2 10 1 0 
Subject 
44 3 5 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 2 
Subject 
45 0 5 1 0 1 2 0 3 2 0 
Subject 
46 10 10 0 0 3 0 2 10 0 3 
Subject 
47 5 1 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 1 5 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 
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B. Low Sanction Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to sanction each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received to sanction from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
SG FGM 1: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction first fellow group member 
SR FGM 1: sanction tokens used by first fellow group member to sanction the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
SG FGM 2: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction second fellow group member 
SR FGM 2: sanction tokens used by second fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
SG FGM 3: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction third fellow group member 
SR FGM 3: sanction tokens used by third fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 8 2 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
2 0 6 0 4 4 0 2 8 0 5 
Subject 
3 2 8 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
4 8 0 5 0 6 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
5 6 0 4 0 4 1 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
6 10 10 0 0 0 0 1 6 0 2 
Subject 
7 10 0 5 1 6 0 2 10 0 0 
Subject 
8 0 10 1 5 6 2 1 10 1 0 
Subject 
9 4 0 2 0 6 0 1 8 0 0 
Subject 
10 4 2 0 0 8 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
11 4 2 0 0 8 0 0 4 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 6 10 2 0 0 1 2 10 2 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
14 3 4 0 1 10 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
15 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
16 4 3 0 0 4 0 1 10 0 0 
Subject 
17 4 3 1 0 10 1 0 4 1 0 
Subject 
18 0 3 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 1 
Subject 
19 3 10 0 0 10 0 1 0 0 0 
Subject 
20 10 3 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
21 10 3 0 0 4 0 1 4 0 0 
Subject 
22 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
23 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 10 3 1 0 10 0 0 0 1 0 
Subject 
25 1 10 0 5 9 0 5 4 0 0 
Subject 
26 4 10 0 1 9 0 2 4 0 0 
Subject 
27 10 1 5 0 9 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
28 4 4 0 0 10 0 1 9 0 2 
Subject 
29 10 4 1 0 9 0 0 4 1 0 
Subject 
30 10 8 0 0 10 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
31 8 10 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
32 10 8 0 0 5 1 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
33 9 4 2 0 10 0 0 4 2 0 
Subject 
34 9 10 0 0 1 5 0 4 3 0 
Subject 
35 4 10 0 0 1 0 0 9 0 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 5 8 0 0 10 0 1 10 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 6 0 2 
Subject 
38 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
39 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 6 0 2 
Subject 
40 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 5 0 
Subject 
41 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
42 3 10 0 1 2 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
43 10 2 9 0 5 0 0 3 1 0 
Subject 
44 2 10 0 9 5 0 1 3 0 0 
Subject 
45 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 5 
Subject 
46 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 6 4 2 
Subject 
47 6 10 2 0 10 2 0 10 2 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 5 10 0 0 2 1 0 3 0 0 
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C. High Reward Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to reward each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received in reward from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
RG FGM 1: reward tokens used by subject to reward first fellow group member 
RR FGM 1: reward tokens used by first fellow group member to reward the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
RG FGM 2: reward tokens used by subject to reward second fellow group member 
RR FGM 2: reward tokens used by second fellow group member to reward the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
RG FGM 3: reward tokens used by subject to reward third fellow group member 
RR FGM 3: reward tokens used by third fellow group member to reward the subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 10 0 0 0 5 0 3 10 2 0 
Subject 
2 0 10 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
3 2 4 1 0 3 0 0 8 2 0 
Subject 
4 8 4 0 2 3 0 3 2 0 2 
Subject 
5 3 4 0 1 8 3 0 2 0 0 
Subject 
6 10 0 0 0 10 0 2 5 0 3 
Subject 
7 10 0 0 0 6 0 4 3 0 5 
Subject 
8 6 0 0 0 10 4 0 3 1 4 
Subject 
9 0 6 0 0 10 0 0 3 0 0 
Subject 
10 5 0 0 0 10 3 0 10 3 0 
Subject 
11 3 0 0 0 6 4 1 10 5 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 4 3 1 0 8 2 0 2 0 1 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 2 8 3 0 5 3 0 4 3 0 
Subject 
14 8 2 0 3 5 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
15 0 10 0 0 7 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
16 4 10 0 1 7 0 1 0 0 0 
Subject 
17 7 10 2 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
18 4 8 0 0 2 0 3 5 0 0 
Subject 
19 3 10 0 0 10 0 3 10 0 0 
Subject 
20 10 10 3 0 3 3 0 10 4 0 
Subject 
21 10 10 0 3 3 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
22 5 8 0 0 2 0 3 4 0 0 
Subject 
23 10 10 0 0 10 0 4 3 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 10 7 2 2 4 1 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
25 0 0 0 0 9 5 0 10 4 0 
Subject 
26 0 0 0 0 9 1 0 10 2 0 
Subject 
27 10 3 0 1 10 0 5 1 0 2 
Subject 
28 1 3 0 0 10 2 0 10 2 0 
Subject 
29 10 3 2 1 1 0 2 10 5 0 
Subject 
30 10 0 0 2 0 0 4 9 5 5 
Subject 
31 8 8 0 0 10 0 1 5 0 0 
Subject 
32 10 8 1 3 8 1 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
33 8 10 3 1 8 0 0 5 0 0 
Subject 
34 9 0 0 1 0 0 5 10 5 5 
Subject 
35 5 8 0 0 10 0 0 8 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 3 10 1 2 1 0 0 10 1 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
1 
RR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
2 
RR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
RG 
FGM 
3 
RR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 10 0 4 10 0 4 4 0 1 
Subject 
38 10 10 4 0 10 4 4 4 2 2 
Subject 
39 10 2 0 1 10 2 5 10 3 3 
Subject 
40 10 2 0 1 10 3 5 10 3 3 
Subject 
41 10 2 0 1 10 5 3 10 5 2 
Subject 
42 4 10 2 2 10 1 0 10 1 0 
Subject 
43 10 5 0 1 5 0 3 6 0 2 
Subject 
44 5 5 0 2 10 3 0 6 0 1 
Subject 
45 5 5 2 0 10 1 0 6 2 1 
Subject 
46 10 10 4 4 10 4 0 4 0 1 
Subject 
47 6 5 1 2 5 1 0 10 2 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 2 10 1 0 10 1 0 10 1 0 
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D. High Sanction Decision Situation 
 
Data is given for the group account allocation of the particular subject, the group 
account allocations of each of the other group members paired with the subject, the 
number of tokens used by the subject to sanction each other group member, and the 
number of tokens the subject received to sanction from each other group member. 
 
GA : group account allocation of subject 
FGM 1 GA: group account allocation of first fellow group member 
SG FGM 1: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction first fellow group member 
SR FGM 1: sanction tokens used by first fellow group member to sanction the subject 
FGM 2 GA: group account allocation of second fellow group member 
SG FGM 2: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction second fellow group member 
SR FGM 2: sanction tokens used by second fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
FGM 3 GA: group account allocation of third fellow group member 
SG FGM 3: sanction tokens used by subject to sanction third fellow group member 
SR FGM 3: sanction tokens used by third fellow group member to sanction the 
subject 
 
       
GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
1 10 8 0 0 7 0 2 10 0 0 
Subject 
2 0 2 0 3 4 0 2 8 0 10 
Subject 
3 2 4 0 0 0 3 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
4 8 2 0 0 4 0 0 0 10 0 
Subject 
5 6 8 0 0 10 0 0 4 2 2 
Subject 
6 10 8 0 0 10 0 0 7 0 2 
Subject 
7 10 8 0 0 6 0 0 4 5 2 
Subject 
8 7 8 4 0 10 2 0 10 2 0 
Subject 
9 8 10 0 0 7 0 4 10 0 0 
Subject 
10 4 2 0 0 0 2 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
11 8 6 0 0 10 0 0 4 0 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
1 
Subject 
12 4 8 2 0 6 2 2 10 2 5 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
13 2 10 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
14 4 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
15 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
16 4 0 0 0 5 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
17 7 10 1 0 2 2 0 10 1 0 
Subject 
18 0 10 0 0 2 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
19 2 10 0 0 7 0 2 10 0 0 
Subject 
20 10 10 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
21 10 2 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
22 5 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
23 10 7 0 1 2 0 0 10 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
2 
Subject 
24 10 10 0 0 7 0 1 2 0 0 
Subject 
25 5 7 0 0 10 0 1 10 0 0 
Subject 
26 6 10 0 0 9 0 3 3 0 0 
Subject 
27 10 9 0 0 6 0 0 3 5 3 
Subject 
28 3 10 3 5 9 2 5 6 0 0 
Subject 
29 9 7 0 0 9 0 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
30 10 7 0 0 5 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
31 9 7 0 0 9 0 0 8 0 0 
Subject 
32 10 7 1 0 5 1 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
33 7 5 0 0 10 0 1 10 0 0 
Subject 
34 9 10 0 0 6 3 0 3 5 2 
Subject 
35 7 9 0 0 9 0 0 8 0 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
3 
Subject 
36 8 7 0 0 9 0 0 9 0 0 
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GA 
FGM 
1   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
1 
SR 
FGM 
1 
FGM 
2   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
2 
SR 
FGM 
2 
FGM 
3   
GA 
SG 
FGM 
3 
SR 
FGM 
3 
Subject 
37 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
38 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
39 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
40 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
41 10 5 0 0 8 0 0 6 0 0 
Subject 
42 4 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 
Subject 
43 8 5 2 0 10 0 0 6 3 0 
Subject 
44 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
45 0 10 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 
Subject 
46 10 10 0 0 10 0 0 10 0 0 
Subject 
47 5 10 0 0 8 0 2 6 4 0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
EX 
4 
Subject 
48 6 5 0 4 10 0 0 8 0 3 
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CHAPTER 4 
The Voluntary Provision of a Public Good with Binding Multi-Round 
Commitments 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Previous VCM studies suggest that reciprocity considerations play an 
important role in explaining allocations to the group account.29  In the repeated VCM 
environment, expectations of reciprocity by other group members may lead a subject 
to make a group-account allocation in one decision round in order to induce larger 
group-account allocations from other group members in future rounds.  This chapter 
reports experiments that add to the traditional repeated VCM setting by allowing 
subjects to make binding multi-round commitments to the group account, before 
subjects choose their final allocation.  These commitments are made simultaneously 
within the group, and the aggregate group commitment is made public before final 
allocations are made.  This process is repeated at 5-round intervals. 
 The multi-round commitment environment investigated here, while essentially 
artificial, has similarities to naturally occurring examples of public goods fund 
raising. The multi-round nature of commitments is similar to mechanisms of public 
goods provision in which contributors commit to contribute a minimum amount at 
repeating intervals of time. For example, The Public Broadcasting System operates 
fund drives that regularly announce the current level of pledges which are often 
collected through regular payroll deductions.  Similarly, religious organizations rely 
                                                 
29 See Croson (1999) as an example. 
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significantly on members making pledges toward regular, weekly or monthly, 
donations. Such pledges are often made public as part of “real time” fund drives.30   
 This study finds that subjects on average tend to make commitments in the 
range of one quarter to one third of endowments.  However, commitments do not 
increase overall average group-account allocations relative to a control VCM 
environment without commitment opportunities.  On the other hand, further analysis 
reveals that commitments affect within-group behavior differentially.  The results 
show that the variance of outcomes across groups is larger in multi-round 
commitment experiments than in control experiments. 
 The chapter is structured as follows.  The following section discusses previous 
experimental research of a similar nature to this chapter.  Section 3 provides a 
description of the experimental design.  Section 4 provides several conjectures of 
behavior based on subjects following norms of reciprocity.  Section 5 presents the 
experimental results.  Finally, Section 6 contains concluding remarks.31 
2. Previous Experimental Research 
 Chen and Komorita (1994) examine several forms of commitment 
mechanisms in a two stage game that is repeated for 10 decision rounds.  In the first 
stage of each round, subjects in a 5 person group are given the opportunity to make a 
commitment.  The second stage of each round is a VCM game.  Their "binding 
pledge" condition is most analogous to the commitment mechanism of this chapter.  
In each decision round, subjects make a binding minimum commitment to the group 
                                                 
30 Similarly, charities often announce a large "leadership" donation.  List and Reilly (2002) presents a 
field experiment confirming that “seed money” can significantly increase the effectiveness of 
fundraising by encouraging more frequent and larger contributions. 
31 The research presented in the chapter will be published in Halloran, Walker, and Williams (2005). 
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account.  In this condition, they find that subjects tend to commit between 20% and 
30% of their endowments.32  However, levels of group allocations are not increased 
relative to experiments without commitment opportunities.   The multi-round 
commitment design of this study allows further examination of Chen and Komorita’s 
conclusions, and examination of the extent to which multi-round commitments have a 
different impact than single-round commitment mechanisms.  In addition, Chen and 
Komorita do not report results related to how the impact of commitments may vary 
across decision making groups or decision rounds.  As discussed below, such 
behavior is important in understanding the role of commitment mechanisms more 
fully. 
Bochet and Putterman (2004) examine a treatment condition with non-binding 
single-period promises to allocate a certain amount to the group account before each 
round.  They find that group-account allocations are not significantly increased 
relative to control experiments unless subjects also have the ability to sanction each 
other.  However, similar to the results of this chapter, Bochet and Putterman (2004) 
also find that non-binding promises lead to a larger dispersion of outcomes across 
groups than in control experiments.  Moreover, comparing average group allocations 
between groups in the control experiments and those in the treatment experiments, 
they find that those groups with the highest group allocations and those with the 
lowest group allocations are observed in the condition with non-binding numerical 
promises. 
 Other studies have employed some aspect of a "real time" public goods 
environment developed by Dorsey (1991).  In Dorsey's "real time" VCM 
                                                 
32 See Chen (1996) for further discussion of similar experiments. 
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environment, a decision round begins with subjects simultaneously making individual 
allocation decisions to the group account.  The decision round continues for a 
publicly announced time interval. During this time, subjects are able to adjust their 
group-account allocation, with adjustments becoming public information.  In the 
increase only treatment subjects can only increase their group allocation.  In the 
increase/decrease treatment, subjects can either increase or decrease their allocation.  
In the increase only treatment, group-account allocations increase relative to the 
allocations observed in control experiments, and allocations do not tend to decay 
across decision rounds.  In the increase/decrease treatment, group allocations tend to 
rapidly decay over time.33   
 Kurzban and Houser (2001) study a variation of Dorsey's environment they 
refer to as a "circular" public goods game. At the beginning of each decision round, 
subjects make a simultaneous allocation of tokens between their private and group 
accounts.  Subsequently, one subject at a time is informed of the aggregate group 
allocation and given the option of changing their allocation.  Each round ends at a 
randomly chosen end-point unknown to the subjects.  At the end of each round, 
payoffs are determined by the final allocation of tokens to the group and private 
accounts.  Kurzban and Houser find that some groups in this environment are able to 
achieve substantial levels of cooperation over a large number of rounds, without 
encountering the decay in contributions that often occurs in the repeated VCM.34 
 
 
                                                 
33 Kurzban, McCabe, Smith, and Wilson (2001) find similar results in a study using Dorsey's "real 
time" environment. 
34 Duffy et al. (2004) also examine a dynamic voluntary contribution game in which subjects act 
sequentially.  Their study finds similar results. 
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3. Experimental Design 
 
 A total of 23 decision-making groups, comprised of 92 participants recruited 
from Indiana University undergraduate economics courses, were studied.  Eighteen 
four-person groups participated in nine experimental sessions conducted in spring 
2004 in the Interdisciplinary Experimental Laboratory at Indiana University, using 
software developed on the NovaNET computer network.  Of these, ten groups 
participated in the treatment condition that allowed for multi-round commitments 
(from now on referred to as MRC) and eight groups participated in the control 
experiments without commitments.  In addition, data is used from five four-person 
groups from a previous study by Laury, Walker, and Williams (1995) that used the 
same VCM procedures and parameters as the control experiments.  This yields a total 
of thirteen control experiments. 
 The VCM procedures implemented in both the MRC and the control 
experiments are based on those used by Isaac, Walker, and Williams (1994). The 
instructions were identical across experiments except for a one-page addition 
describing the multi-round commitment mechanism in the MRC experiments.35  
Participants completed a sequence of 30 decision-making rounds. At the start of each 
round, individual i was endowed with Zi tokens which were divided between a private 
account, earning a constant return of pi per token, and a group account, earning a 
return based upon the total number of tokens allocated by the group. Tokens could 
not be carried across rounds. For a given round, let mi, represent individual i’s 
allocation of tokens to the group account and ∑mj represent the sum of tokens placed 
                                                 
35 The experimental instructions are displayed in this chapter's Appendix A.  The experimental data is 
presented in Appendix B. 
 104
in the group account by all other individuals (j ≠ i). Each individual earned [G(mi 
+∑mj)]/N cents from the group account. Because each individual received a 1/N share 
of the total earnings from the group account, the group account was a pure public 
good.  The experiments were parameterized so that participants in groups of size N = 
4 were each endowed with 40 tokens per round. The return from each individual’s 
private account was 1 cent per token. Defining the marginal per-capita return from the 
group account (MPCR) as the ratio of benefits to costs for moving a single token 
from the private account to the group account, or G'(·)/N, the group account earned 
2.2 cents per token allocated, yielding an MPCR = 0.55. 
The return from the private account, and the function G(·) were chosen so that 
the Pareto Optimum (the outcome that maximizes group earnings) was for each 
individual to place all tokens in the group account.  However, under the assumption 
of individual earnings maximization and common information, the Nash equilibrium 
was for each individual to place zero tokens in the group account.  
 Each individual was informed of the number of rounds, their token 
endowment, the group’s aggregate token endowment, and the returns from the private 
and group accounts. Subjects also knew that they would be randomly assigned to 
groups of size 4 and would remain in those groups for the duration of the experiment. 
It was explained that the decisions for each round were binding and that end-of-
experiment earnings would be the sum of individual earnings from all rounds. Prior to 
the start of each round, participants were shown information on their own earnings for 
the previous round as well as the total number of tokens placed by the entire group in 
the group account. During each round, subjects could view their personal token 
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allocations, earnings, and total tokens placed in the group account for all previous 
rounds. 
 Prior to the 1st, 6th, 11th, 16th, 21st, and 26th round of the MRC experiments, 
subjects were given the option of making a binding 5-round commitment.36  The 
aggregate group commitment of tokens to the group account was made public.  
Subjects were shown both their individual commitment and the aggregate group 
commitment on the computerized display used for eliciting their allocation decision 
in each round.   
4. Conjectures 
 Under the assumption that all subjects act to maximize earnings and this is 
common knowledge, the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the game 
studied here is zero allocations to the group account. The addition of opportunities to 
make binding multi-round commitments does not change this prediction. 
 Building on the discussion presented in Bochet and Putterman (2004), 
suppose some subjects follow norms of behavior in which they prefer to cooperate 
when they believe others are cooperating, and to be less cooperative when they 
believe that others are not cooperating.  These subjects would have utility based upon 
their monetary earnings as well as a reciprocity component.  Finally, assume subjects 
begin with prior beliefs about the prevalence of reciprocating subjects.  In this case, 
the repeated VCM game becomes a Bayesian game of the type analyzed in Kreps et 
al. (1982) in which subjects adjust their choices as they update their prior beliefs 
about others as the game progresses.   
                                                 
36 If a subject tried to make a group account allocation smaller than his commitment within any 
particular round, the subject received a message that he was in violation of his commitment and was 
prompted to reenter his allocation to the group account. 
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 Many types of alternative preferences have been suggested to explain positive 
group allocations in VCM experiments, for example unconditional altruism, or 
individuals that receive a “warm glow” from giving.  We have chosen to focus on 
reciprocity because it is best suited to explaining the dynamics of contributions across 
rounds in our experiment.  Also, past research has indicated that reciprocity has more 
predictive power than altruism related theories.  Similar to other studies, Croson 
(1999) finds that group-account allocations are significantly positively related to both 
the group allocations of other subjects, and to beliefs about those allocations, 
providing strong support for reciprocity theories.   
In the control experiments, in the presence of reciprocating subjects, a group 
may be able to sustain significant levels of cooperation across rounds if large group-
account allocations made in the first round are reciprocated in future rounds, as 
observed in Gunnthorsdottir et al. (2005). On the other hand, if subjects are paired 
with individuals who make low initial allocations to the group account, reciprocity 
may lead to decay in group allocations across rounds, as is often observed in finitely 
repeated VCM experiments.  Clearly, a similar result could be observed if some 
subjects do not follow norms of reciprocity and do not reciprocate the positive group 
allocations of other group members. 
 Binding multi-round commitment opportunities may have implications for 
reciprocal behavior.  Subjects have more reliable information about the future 
behavior of the other subjects in their group, and importantly, about the extent to 
which cooperative behavior can be exploited in future rounds. Further, binding 
commitments allow subjects to make more public their intentions toward cooperation. 
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A reciprocating subject may signal intentions to be cooperative by making a large 
commitment, and if large commitments by other group members are observed, the 
subject may reciprocate by increasing his group-account allocation above his 
commitment.  This process could potentially continue in future rounds in which new 
commitments are solicited, leading to sustained high levels of cooperation.  However, 
if a reciprocating subject encounters commitments by others that are small compared 
to his own, the subject may respond by making no group allocations above his 
commitment, and by decreasing his commitment at the next opportunity.  Following 
this logic, in the presence of reciprocators, the following outcomes may be 
supportable.   
• In both control and MRC experiments, when a subject encounters group 
allocations by other group members that are large relative to his own, he will 
increase his group allocation in the following round, and when a subject 
encounters group allocations small relative to his own, he will decrease his 
group allocation in the following round. 
• In MRC experiments, a subset of subjects will be observed making positive 
commitments. Further, a subject will increase his allocation above his 
commitment by a larger amount when encountering commitments by other 
group members that are large relative to his own, and will increase his 
allocation above his commitment less when encountering commitments by 
other group members that are small relative to his own. 
• In MRC experiments, a subject will increase his current commitment above 
his prior commitment in the previous 5-round commitment block if the 
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commitments of other group members were large relative to his own in the 
previous block, and decrease his commitment below his commitment in the 
previous block if the commitments of other group members were small 
relative to his own in the previous block.  
• Due to the fact that multi-round commitments allow subjects to acquire more 
reliable information about the future behavior of other group members than is 
possible in the control experiments, a larger dispersion of outcomes across 
groups will be observed in the MRC experiments than in the control 
experiments.  High levels of cooperation may be more easily maintained in 
the MRC experiments, while low levels of cooperation may be more extreme. 
5. Results 
 The empirical analysis begins by considering aggregate allocations in the 
MRC and control experiments. This analysis is followed with a more detailed focus 
on individual behavior in both the MRC and control experiments. The final results 
turn to an examination of the variation of within-group and across-group behavior in 
the MRC and control experiments. 
5.1 Group-Account Allocations across Treatment Conditions 
Result 1.  Average group-account allocations across rounds are similar in the MRC 
and control experiments.  However, the decay in the average group-account allocation 
observed in the control experiments is not evident in the MRC experiments. 
 
Figure 9 displays average group-account allocations for each round in the 
MRC experiments and the control experiments.  Behavior in the control experiments 
is similar to behavior in similarly parameterized linear public goods experiments.  
Average group-account allocations decay from 53.32% in the first round to 29.76% in 
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the final round.  This change is statistically significant.37  Consistent with previous 
studies decay is not monotonic across rounds.   
In the MRC experiments, the average group-account allocation pooled across 
all rounds is 45.77% of endowment.  In the control experiments it is 45.83%.  A t-test 
and a Wilcoxon test confirm that the average difference in group-account allocations 
is not significantly different.38  However, as one can observe from Figure 9, there is 
an interesting difference in the behavior across decision rounds in the MRC 
experiments relative to the control experiments. In early rounds, average group-
account allocations are actually higher in the control experiments. However, unlike 
the control experiments, average group-account allocations do not decay across 
rounds in the MRC experiments. In fact, average group-account allocations are higher 
in the last round of the MRC experiments, 47.25%, than in the first round, 42.31%.39  
Clearly, we cannot conclude that group-account allocations decline as rounds advance 
in the MRC experiments. By the last three rounds of the experiments, the average 
group-account allocations in the MRC experiments are well above those in the control 
experiments, although the difference is not statistically significant. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Matched pairs t-test (p = 0.020), matched pairs Wilcoxon test (p = 0.034), observations for 13 
groups in each round. 
38 t-test ( p= 0.977), Wilcoxon-test (p= 0.904),  390 observations in control experiments, 300 
observations in MRC experiments.  
39 Matched pairs t-test (p = 0.629), matched pairs Wilcoxon-test (p = 0.922), 10 observations per 
round. 
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5.2 Prevalence of Commitments in MRC experiments  
Result 2. Subjects on average make positive commitments at each opportunity and 
there is no sign of decay in average commitments. A large portion of group 
allocations are pre-committed in every round. 
 
Figure 10 displays the average commitment of tokens for each round, and the 
average group-account allocation in each round of the MRC treatment.  Commitments 
average between 25% and 33% of endowments.40  Further, there is no noticeable 
decay in average commitments. In fact, average commitments are highest at the final 
opportunity before round 26.  The large variation of individual commitment decisions 
is a second general feature of the data.  Figure 11, which displays the distribution of 
individual commitments pooled across the 6 commitment blocks illustrates.  Less 
than 14% of individual commitments are for zero tokens.  On the other hand, over 
80% of commitments are for 50% or less of the token endowment.  The average 
individual commitment when pooling across all commitment opportunities, is 27.72% 
of the token endowment, the median is 25% of the endowment. 
 Returning to the aggregate treatment results shown in Figure 10, observe that 
more than 50% of total group allocations in every round are pre-committed.  A 
maximum of 71% of group allocations are pre-committed in round 1. 
5.3 Evidence of Reciprocity in MRC and Control Experiments 
 
 To examine the extent of reciprocity, I investigate how individuals respond to 
deviations from the behavior of other group members in the case of both group 
allocations and commitments.  I begin with analysis of the MRC experiments, and 
conclude with analysis of the control experiments. 
                                                 
40 The size of commitments in percentage terms observed in the MRC experiments are consistent with 
the results observed in the previously referenced Chen and Komorita (1994) study on single-round 
commitments. 
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Result 3. In the first round of each commitment block of the MRC experiments, a 
subject makes his additional group-account allocation above his commitment larger 
or smaller in response to the deviation of his commitment from the mean commitment 
of other group members. 
 
 Define Aijt1 as individual i’s allocation to the group j group account in round 1 
of block t, and Cijt as i’s commitment to the group j group account in block t.   Then, 
the additional group allocation a subject makes above his commitment in round 1 of 
block t can be defined as ΔACitj1 = Aijt1 – Cijt.  Further, define ijtC− as the mean 
commitment of other group j members in block t.  The deviation of a subject i’s 
commitment from the mean commitment of other group j members can then be 
defined as ijtijtijt CCC −−=Ω  
Table 14 displays estimates of the following subject specific random effects 
model: 
1
10
2
1 ijti
j
jgjBijtcoijt uDBLOCKCAC εββββ ++++Ω+=Δ ∑
=
 
BLOCK is the commitment block number added to the regression to control for 
intertemporal effects.  Dummy variables, Dj, for experimental groups 2 through 10 
are also added.  A Tobit specification is used for estimation purposes because ΔACijt1 
is bounded from below at 0.   
 Providing strong evidence for reciprocity, cβ  is negative and strongly 
significant.  The estimated marginal effect of -.281 for the βc coefficient reflects a 
strong tendency for participants to reciprocate commitment decisions with group-
account allocation responses.  When their commitments are less than the average 
commitment of others, individuals tend to choose larger additional group-account 
allocations in the first round of each block.  When individuals commit more than the 
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average commitment of others, they tend to choose smaller additional group-account 
allocations in round 1 of each block.   Also, the sign of Bβ , the commitment block 
coefficient, is negative, meaning that as commitment blocks advance, subjects tend to 
increase group-account allocations above commitments less.41  Bβ  is marginally 
statistically significant. 
Result 4.  In rounds 2 through 5 of each 5 round commitment block, a subject makes 
his additional group-account allocation above his commitment larger or smaller in 
response to the deviation of his commitment from the mean commitment of other 
group members. At the same time, a subject responds reciprocally to how much other 
members of his group increased their group-account allocations above their 
commitments in the previous round. 
 
Define A-itjk-1 as the total amount other group j members besides subject i 
allocated to the group account in round k-1 of commitment block t, and C-itjk-1 as the 
total commitment of other group j members besides subject i in round k-1 of 
commitment block t.  Then, ΔAC-itk-1 = A-itjk-1 - C-itjk-1  is the total amount that other 
group j members besides subject i increased their group-account allocations above 
their commitments in round k-1 of block t.  Table 15 displays Tobit estimates of the 
following regression model with subject specific random effects: 
ijtki
j
jgjBitkAcijtkcoijtk uDBLOCKACCAC εβββββ ++++Δ+Ω+=Δ ∑
=
−−
10
2
1  
The index on round, k, can take the values of 2 through 5, as there are 5 rounds in 
each commitment block, and in the case of the dependent variable, data from the first 
round is omitted.  
                                                 
41 Regressions were also performed using separate dummy variables for each block instead of the 
commitment block number, with similar results. 
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cβ  is negative and strongly significant with a marginal effect of -0.383.  
Therefore, similar to result 3, when their commitments are less than the average of the 
commitments of others, individuals tend to offer larger additional group-account 
allocations, and when individuals commit more than the average commitment of 
others, they tend to offer smaller additional group-account allocations.   At the same 
time, Acβ  is positive and statistically significant with a marginal effect of 0.122, 
meaning that the more that other group members increased their group-account 
allocations above their commitments in the previous round, the more a subject 
increases his group-account allocation above his commitment in the current round. 
Bβ  is negative and statistically significant in this case, meaning that as commitment 
blocks advance, subjects tend to increase group-account allocations above 
commitments less. 
Result 5. In the MRC experiments, subjects adjust their commitments at each 
opportunity in response to the difference between their previous commitment and the 
average previous commitment of other group members, and in response to how much 
other group members increased their group allocations above their commitments in 
the previous commitment block. 
  
Define 1−−=Δ ijtijtijt CCC  as the difference between subject i’s commitment in 
block t and his commitment in block t-1.  Secondly, define 1−−Δ ijtAC  as the total 
amount that other group j members besides subject i increased their group-account 
allocations above their commitments averaged over the previous 5 round commitment 
block.  Table 16 displays GLS estimates of the following regression model with 
subject specific random effects: 
ijti
j
jgjBijtAcijtcoijt
uDBLOCKACCC εβββββ ++++Δ+Ω+=Δ ∑
=
−−−
10
2
11  
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GLS estimates are used because in this case the dependent variable is not bounded 
from below at zero. cβ = -0.458 is negative and significant, implying that the larger 
the positive deviation of a subject’s commitment from the average commitment of 
others in the previous commitment block, the less a subject increases his current 
commitment above his previous commitment.  Also, Acβ  = 0.124 is positive and 
significant, implying that the more that other group members increased their group-
account allocations above their commitments over the five rounds of the previous 
commitment block, the more subjects tend to raise their commitments relative to the 
previous commitment opportunity.  In this case the sign of Bβ  is positive, and weakly 
statistically significant. 
 The following analysis turns to an examination of individual behavior in the 
control experiments. In particular, the analysis examines the extent to which changes 
in subjects’ group allocations across decisions rounds can be linked to the past 
decisions of other group members. 
Result 6. In the control experiments, subjects reciprocate group allocation decisions 
in round k-1 with larger or smaller group allocations in round k. 
 
Table 17 displays GLS estimates of the following regression model with 
subject specific random effects: 
ijki
j
jgjRijkAijk uDROUNDAA εβββ ++++Ω=Δ ∑
=
−
13
2
1  
The dependent variable, 1−−=Δ ijkijkijk AAA , is the difference between subject i in 
group j’s group-account allocation in round k and his group-account allocation in 
round k-1.  AAA ijkijk −=Ω −− 11 -ijk-1 is the difference between subject i’s group-account 
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allocation in round k-1 and the average group-account allocation of the other 
members of subject i’s group in round k-1.  ROUND is the round number added to 
the regression to control for intertemporal effects.  
The results indicate that in the control experiments, subjects tend to increase 
their group-account allocation above their previous group-account allocation if their 
group-account allocation was below the average of other group members’ allocations 
in the previous round, and to decrease their group-account allocation if their group-
account allocation was above the average of other group members allocations in the 
previous round. Aβ  is negative and strongly significant.  The coefficient on round 
number, Rβ , has a negative sign, but is not statistically significant.42 
The analysis that relates to the final two results is designed to examine to what 
extent the dispersion of within-group individual behavior and across-group behavior 
varies between the MRC and control experiments. 
5.4 Across-Group Dispersion in Group-Account Allocations 
 
Result 7. Less variation in individual allocations to the group account is observed 
within groups in the MRC experiments than in the control experiments. 
 
 Within each decision round and each group, one can compute the standard 
deviation of individual allocations to the group account. Figure 12 displays the 
average within-group standard deviation for the MRC and the control experiments.  
With the exception of the first five rounds, and the final five rounds, the average 
within-group standard deviation is smaller in the MRC treatment. This difference in 
average within-group standard deviations is statistically significant when pooling 
                                                 
42 Regressions were performed using separate dummy variables for each round instead of the round 
number, with similar results. 
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across rounds (two sample t-test and Wilcoxin two sample test, p=0.000). This 
observation suggests that the commitment mechanism, by providing additional 
information, may have allowed individuals in each group to more closely reciprocate, 
and conform to the behavior of other group members.   
Result 8.  A larger variance in group outcomes is observed in the MRC experiments 
than the control experiments. 
 
 Earlier discussion conjectured that multi-round commitments may allow 
subjects to acquire more reliable information about the future behavior of other group 
members than is possible in the control experiments.  This may create a larger 
dispersion of allocations to the group account across groups in the MRC experiments 
relative to the control experiments.  To investigate this possibility, we separate groups 
in the MRC and control experiments into two categories; those groups with an 
average group-account allocation higher than the overall average of groups in their 
treatment condition, "high groups", and those with a lower average group-account 
allocation, "low groups".  
Figure 13 displays the average difference between high groups and low 
groups in the MRC experiments and the average difference between high groups and 
low groups in the control experiments.  The results are quite striking. The average 
difference between the high and low groups is larger for the MRC experiments than 
for the control experiments in the vast majority of rounds.  This result is largely 
driven by the behavior of low groups in the MRC treatment; in 27 of 30 rounds the 
average allocation to the group account is smaller in the MRC low groups than in the 
control low groups.  In contrast, there is frequent overlap in the average allocation to 
the group account when comparing the high groups of the MRC and control 
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experiments, although in late decision rounds the average group-account allocation in 
the high MRC groups tends to be above the average in the control experiments. 
 Figure 14 provides further evidence in support of Result 8.   Figure 14 
displays average commitments and average group-account allocations for an example 
high group and an example low group from the MRC experiments.  It is quite 
apparent that the maintenance of cooperative outcomes is enhanced by increasing 
commitments as rounds advance in the high group.  While in the low group, average 
commitments decrease across rounds, as do average group-account allocations. 
6. Conclusions 
 This chapter examines the effects of allowing binding multi-round 
commitments of tokens to the group account in a repeated voluntary contributions 
mechanism (VCM) game.  Subjects make binding commitments averaging between 
25% and 33% of their endowments.  However, total group-account allocations are not 
systematically greater on average in the MRC experiments than those observed in the 
control experiments. Although, in the final decision rounds, average group-account 
allocations in MRC experiments tend to be higher than the control experiments, due 
to the lack of decay in group allocations in the MRC treatment. 
 The study finds strong evidence of subjects following norms of reciprocity in 
the MRC experiments.  Subjects respond reciprocally to other subjects when deciding 
how large to make a commitment before each commitment block, and also when 
deciding how much to increase their group-account allocation above their 
commitment in each round.  Evidence for reciprocity was also found in the control 
experiments as group-account allocations responded to decisions in prior rounds. 
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The results of this chapter are largely consistent with Bochet and Putterman 
(2004) which studies non-binding numerical promises in the VCM.  While binding 
multi-round commitments have little effect on the average level of group-account 
allocations relative to the control experiments, commitments appear to promote more 
homogeneity within groups as subjects respond to commitments in a reciprocal 
manner.  Further, there is a larger variance of group outcomes in the MRC 
experiments relative to the control experiments, leading to patterns of group 
cooperation that are more extreme.   
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Tables 
 
Table 14. Reciprocity and Group-Account Allocations – First Round of Each 
Commitment Block 
 
 
N = 240        Individuals = 40 
 
Dependent Variable: 1ijtACΔ  
 
Coefficient S.E. p Marginal Effect S.E. p 
ijtCΩ  -0.522 0.127 0.000 -0.281 0.068 0.000
BLOCK -0.748 0.395 0.058 -0.402 0.233 0.084
Constant 7.667 2.333 0.001 4.123 1.645 0.012
GROUP 2 -5.435 2.973 0.068 -2.922 1.690 0.084
GROUP 3 -6.951 5.054 0.169 -3.738 2.639 0.157
GROUP 4 -1.838 9.432 0.846 -0.988 5.035 0.844
GROUP 5 -0.206 6.026 0.973 -0.112 3.234 0.973
GROUP 6 6.699 11.697 0.567 3.602 6.723 0.592
GROUP 7 -9.806 2.863 0.001 -5.273 1.868 0.005
GROUP 8 -12.587 4.105 0.002 -6.768 2.547 0.008
GROUP 9 -6.426 4.601 0.163 -3.455 2.486 0.165
GROUP 
10 -4.998 16.934 0.768 -2.687 8.744 0.759
Log Likelihood = -574.380      
 
Note: 1ijtACΔ  = 0 for 103 observations.
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Table 15. Reciprocity and Group-Account Allocations – Rounds 2-5 of Each 
Commitment Block 
 
 
N = 960      Individuals = 40 
 
Dependent Variable: ijtkACΔ  
 
Coefficient S.E. p Marginal Effect S.E. p 
ijtkCΩ  -0.569 0.034 0.000 -0.383 0.036 0.000 
1−−Δ itkAC  0.182 0.028 0.000 0.122 0.016 0.000 
BLOCK -0.416 0.150 0.006 -0.281 0.101 0.006 
Constant 6.951 2.200 0.002 4.679 1.540 0.002 
GROUP 2 -2.919 2.980 0.327 -1.965 1.998 0.326 
GROUP 3 -4.293 4.076 0.292 -2.890 2.693 0.283 
GROUP 4 -2.455 3.526 0.486 -1.653 2.345 0.481 
GROUP 5 -3.523 3.772 0.350 -2.378 2.511 0.344 
GROUP 6 0.996 4.667 0.831 0.671 3.157 0.832 
GROUP 7 -9.560 3.953 0.016 -6.435 2.586 0.0128
GROUP 8 -14.634 5.761 0.011 -9.851 3.562 0.006 
GROUP 9 -8.735 3.610 0.016 -5.880 2.392 0.014 
GROUP 
10 -3.132 3.794 0.409 -2.108 2.529 0.405 
Log Likelihood = -2578.910      
 
Note: ijtkACΔ  = 0 for 341 observations. 
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Table 16. Reciprocity and Commitments   
 
 
N = 200         Number of Individuals = 
40 
 
Dependent Variable: ijtCΔ  
 Coefficient S.E. p 
1−Ω ijtC  -0.458 0.053 0.000
1−−Δ ijtAC  0.124 0.044 0.002
BLOCK 0.772 0.315 0.014
Constant -7.334 2.996 0.014
GROUP 2 1.381 2.896 0.634
GROUP 3 -0.115 2.965 0.969
GROUP 4 -0.150 2.931 0.959
GROUP 5 2.040 2.918 0.485
GROUP 6 2.066 2.853 0.469
GROUP 7 1.073 3.068 0.727
GROUP 8 3.114 3.206 0.803
GROUP 9 0.763 3.049 0.803
GROUP 10 2.951 2.957 0.318
R2 = 0.244 
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Table 17.  Reciprocity in Control Experiments 
 
N = 1508            Number of Individuals = 
40 
 
Dependent Variable: ijkAΔ  
 Coefficient S.E. p 
1−Ω ijkA  -0.535 0.022 0.000 
ROUND -0.025 0.033 0.454  
Constant -0.306 1.980 0.877 
GROUP 2 0.190 2.696 0.944 
GROUP 3 0.345 2.696 0.898 
GROUP 4 -0.181 2.696 0.947 
GROUP 5 -0.198 2.696 0.941 
GROUP 6 0.784 2.696 0.771 
GROUP 7 0.793 2.696 0.769 
GROUP 8 0.888 2.696 0.742 
GROUP 9 0.448 2.696 0.868 
GROUP 10 0.983 2.696 0.716 
GROUP 11 -0.241 2.696 0.929 
GROUP 12 0.448 2.696 0.868 
GROUP 13 0.707 2.696 0.793 
R2 = 0.203 
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Figure 9. Average Group-Account Allocations: MRC and Control Experiments 
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Figure 10. Average Individual Commitments and Group-Account Allocations: MRC 
Experiments 
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Figure 11. Distribution of Individual Commitments 
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Figure 12. Within-Group Standard Deviations of Individual Group-Account 
Allocations 
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Figure 13. Differences in Average Group Allocations: High Groups and Low Groups 
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Figure 14.  Group-Account Allocations and Commitments in MRC Experiments –  
Example High Group and Example Low Group 
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CHAPTER 4 - APPENDIX A - EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
These instructions are copied from sequential interactive NovaNet displays. The 
instructions are presented to the subjects in a sequential manner - paragraph by 
paragraph.  Subjects are able to review prior information at any time. 
 
The fifth page of instructions was only included in the instructions for the MRC 
experiments, subjects in the control experiments only saw the first four pages. 
 
1st Page: 
 
This is an exercise in the economics of group decision making. When you logged into 
the 
exercise for the first time, you were randomly assigned to a particular group along 
with 3 other people. 
 
The exercise will occur over a sequence of 30 decision-making rounds. At the start of 
each round you will be endowed with 40 "tokens". In each round, you must decide 
how to divide your tokens between your "PRIVATE ACCOUNT" and a "GROUP 
ACCOUNT". Each person in the group has a Private Account, however, there is only 
one Group Account for the entire group. 
 
Press -NEXT- to continue. 
 
 
2nd Page: 
 
You will earn $ 0.01 for each token that you retain in your PRIVATE ACCOUNT in 
any 
decision-making round. Thus, if you choose to retain all of your 40 tokens in your 
private account you will earn $ 0.40 in that round from your private account. 
 
Everyone in the group will receive the same portion of the earnings from the GROUP 
ACCOUNT. Thus, if 4 people are in your group, you will receive 1/4 = 25% of the 
group earnings from the group account regardless of the number of tokens that you 
place in the group account. 
 
It is important to realize that EVERYONE in the group receives a 1/4 share of the 
earnings from the group account. This is true for each individual regardless of the 
number of tokens that the individual places in the group account. 
 
Press -NEXT- to continue or -BACK- to review. 
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3rd Page: 
 
Here is a table that shows how both group earnings and your individual earnings from 
the group account will vary with the number of tokens placed in the group account. 
This table will be displayed on your viewing screen during each round of the 
exercise. 
 
Examples of possible earnings from the GROUP ACCOUNT 
   Tokens in GROUP ACCOUNT                              Total                                     Your 25% share 
          (from the entire group)                           Group Earnings                            of Group Earnings 
                      0                                                          $ 0.000                                           $ 0.000 
                     10                                                         $ 0.220                                           $ 0.055 
                     20                                                         $ 0.440                                           $ 0.110 
                     30                                                         $ 0.660                                           $ 0.165 
                     40                                                         $ 0.880                                           $ 0.220 
                     50                                                         $ 1.100                                           $ 0.275 
                     60                                                         $ 1.320                                           $ 0.330 
                     70                                                         $ 1.540                                           $ 0.385 
                     90                                                         $ 1.980                                           $ 0.495 
                   100                                                         $ 2.200                                           $ 0.550 
                   110                                                         $ 2.420                                           $ 0.605 
                   120                                                         $ 2.640                                           $ 0.660 
                   130                                                         $ 2.860                                           $ 0.715 
                   140                                                         $ 3.080                                           $ 0.770 
                   150                                                         $ 3.300                                           $ 0.825 
                   160                                                         $ 3.520                                           $ 0.880 
 
The first row in the table indicates that the MINIMUM number of tokens that can be 
placed in the group account is 0. This will occur if everyone in the group places no 
tokens in the group account and will result in group earnings from the group account 
of $0. 
 
The last row in the table indicates that the MAXIMUM number of tokens that can be 
placed in the group account is 160. This is the summation of the individual token 
endowments for the entire group and would result in group earnings from the group 
account of $3.52.  
 
The table reveals that for token 1 through token 160 placed in the group account, total 
group earnings from the group account increase by $0.022 per token. Thus, each 
individual's earnings from the group account increase by $0.022 / 4 = $0.0055 per 
token over this range. 
 
The information that just appeared above the table will appear on your display each 
round. You will also be able to see "Total Group Earnings" and "Your Share of Group 
Earnings" for any level of "Tokens in Group Account" not already displayed in the 
table. You will be able to access this option by pressing the -LAB-key. 
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Prior to entering your decisions for rounds 2 - 30 you will be shown the results from 
the 
previous round. You will also be able to review the results from ANY previous round 
by pressing the -DATA- key. 
 
You will be able to review the instructions prior to making your decision in any round 
by 
pressing the -HELP- key. 
 
 
4th Page: 
 
In order to make sure that you understand how each round will proceed, let's work 
through an instructive example of the decision entry process that you will go through 
each round. 
 
INSTRUCTIVE EXAMPLE ONLY -- this is the question that you will be asked 
during each round of the exercise. Type in a number and then press -NEXT-. 
 
How many tokens do you wish to place in the GROUP ACCOUNT? ? 23 
 
After pressing -NEXT-, you must confirm your entry by pressing -STOP-. Your entry 
will then be stored permanently in the database for your group. If you make a typing 
error or change your mind, press -BACK-. 
 
Tokens to GROUP ACCOUNT: 23 -- Tokens to PRIVATE ACCOUNT: 17 
-STOP- confirm these decisions. 
-BACK- start over. 
 
You know that you will earn $ 0.01 * 17 = $ 0.17 from your PRIVATE ACCOUNT 
in this round. You do not know, however, how much you will earn from the GROUP 
ACCOUNT since you do not yet know how many tokens everyone else in the group 
will place in the group account. 
 
The number of tokens placed by the entire group in the group account, your earnings 
from the group account, and your earnings from the private account will be reported 
to you prior to entering your decision for the next round. 
 
Press -NEXT- to continue or -BACK- to review. 
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5th Page: 
 
Special Instructions for Today's Experiment 
 
Before rounds 1, 6, 11, 16, etc. everyone in your group (including you) will be asked 
to enter a commitment of tokens allocated to the group account for each of the next 5 
rounds. You may choose any number of tokens from 0 to 40 as your commitment. A 
commitment sets your minimum allocation to the group account for each of the next 5 
rounds. 
 
For example, if you choose X tokens as your commitment to the group account prior 
to round 1, you must place at least X tokens into the group account in each of rounds 
1 through 5. You will then enter a new commitment of tokens to the group account 
(between 0 and 40) after round 5 is finished, but before round 6 begins. This new 
commitment will set your minimum allocation of tokens to the group account for 
each of the next 5 rounds (rounds 6 through 10). 
 
After all commitment decisions have been entered, the total number of tokens 
committed to the group account will be displayed to everyone in the group. When you 
are prompted to enter your allocation decision in each round you will be shown your 
own commitment of tokens to the group account as well as the sum of the group's 
commitments to the group account, which will include your own personal 
commitment. 
 
This is the end of the instructions. 
Press -NEXT- to enter the exercise. 
Press -BACK- to review the instructions. 
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CHAPTER 4 - APPENDIX B - EXPERIMENTAL DATA 
 
First, data from the 10 experimental groups that participated in the MRC experiment 
is presented.  Secondly, data from the 13 experimental groups that participated in the 
control experiments is presented. 
 
1. Multi Round Commitment (MRC) Experiments 
 
Commitments are made before the 1st, 6th, 11th, 16th, 21st, and 26th rounds.   All 
data is in tokens.  At each commitment opportunity, the number shown is the number 
of tokens committed by the subject per round in each of the following five rounds.  
The data for each round is the total number of tokens allocated to the group account 
by the subject in that round.  In each round, subjects have a forty token endowment. 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 
 Subject 
1 
Subject 
2 
Subject 
3 
Subject 
4 
Subject 
5 
Subject 
6 
Subject 
7 
Subject 
8 
COM1 0 6 5 10 3 5 25 22 
R1 30 8 5 11 8 5 25 25 
R2 35 15 5 23 40 10 30 25 
R3 35 21 10 27 3 20 35 30 
R4 35 34 15 33 7 30 40 22 
R5 35 30 20 39 22 30 40 30 
COM6 0 7 8 30 14 25 20 20 
R6 38 8 10 30 20 30 25 35 
R7 38 20 8 30 14 25 30 20 
R8 30 30 8 32 14 25 38 40 
R9 30 35 8 30 26 35 30 38 
R10 0 7 8 31 21 30 25 40 
COM11 0 4 5 1 3 20 20 25 
R11 30 5 5 4 9 20 20 30 
R12 30 15 5 6 12 25 25 35 
R13 30 25 5 8 40 30 20 25 
R14 30 4 5 12 13 35 20 40 
R15 5 20 5 6 17 25 20 40 
COM16 8 5 10 3 18 20 10 10 
R16 30 10 10 7 18 20 10 35 
R17 30 30 10 9 25 30 15 38 
R18 30 20 12 11 35 25 10 39 
R19 30 16 10 9 18 30 10 10 
R20 8 10 10 13 22 30 10 10 
COM21 10 2 5 3 5 30 5 20 
R21 25 9 5 7 20 30 5 30 
R22 40 20 20 7 35 40 5 20 
R23 40 25 30 13 7 40 5 35 
R24 40 30 35 20 7 40 8 35 
R25 40 10 10 14 24 40 8 40 
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 Group 1 Group 2 
 Subject 1 
Subject 
2 
Subject 
3 
Subject 
4 
Subject 
5 
Subject 
6 
Subject 
7 
Subject 
8 
COM26 15 8 10 7 8 30 5 23 
R26 25 15 10 11 9 30 8 23 
R27 40 25 25 15 8 40 5 30 
R28 40 30 20 17 8 30 10 23 
R29 40 9 20 16 16 30 13 23 
R30 15 9 25 11 8 30 15 30 
 
 
 Group 3 Group 4 
 Subject  9 
Subject 
10 
Subject 
11 
Subject 
12 
Subject 
13 
Subject 
14 
Subject 
15 
Subject 
16 
COM1 15 25 40 20 10 40 1 10 
R1 20 35 40 22 13 40 5 13 
R2 17 30 40 30 15 40 7 19 
R3 15 25 40 40 15 40 1 20 
R4 25 28 40 30 17 40 3 18 
R5 20 35 40 39 10 40 3 24 
COM6 10 30 20 25 0 10 1 12 
R6 15 30 20 32 0 22 1 13 
R7 17 30 20 25 15 18 10 13 
R8 30 31 25 40 40 18 5 19 
R9 18 35 40 40 20 25 7 25 
R10 19 34 30 40 19 40 5 15 
COM11 5 25 5 40 10 10 1 15 
R11 10 25 15 40 19 18 5 17 
R12 18 40 40 40 19 18 6 16 
R13 25 34 40 40 22 18 7 15 
R14 22 25 5 40 20 18 5 18 
R15 24 31 20 40 30 30 3 18 
COM16 18 20 15 40 10 10 1 16 
R16 19 40 20 40 20 30 3 18 
R17 20 35 15 40 30 18 2 21 
R18 18 20 40 40 20 30 2 17 
R19 19 25 15 40 25 18 1 19 
R20 21 40 15 40 20 10 5 16 
COM21 8 10 5 40 15 0 1 5 
R21 10 10 5 40 15 0 40 12 
R22 16 10 40 40 15 0 1 19 
R23 18 15 5 40 25 18 5 13 
R24 17 10 5 40 21 0 5 18 
R25 20 20 5 40 21 18 3 17 
COM26 18 5 1 40 20 0 1 11 
R26 20 20 1 40 20 0 5 16 
R27 18 40 1 40 20 0 3 17 
R28 19 5 40 40 20 0 10 30 
R29 18 5 15 40 20 0 5 16 
R30 18 5 1 40 20 0 10 12 
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 Group 5 Group 6 
 Subject 17 
Subject 
18 
Subject 
19 
Subject 
20 
Subject 
21 
Subject 
22 
Subject 
23 
Subject 
24 
COM1 10 40 6 20 5 3 20 8 
R1 17 40 20 24 10 4 20 8 
R2 20 40 25 25 12 30 20 8 
R3 23 40 27 29 13 15 20 12 
R4 20 40 31 27 12 18 20 13 
R5 23 40 30 23 17 20 35 8 
COM6 12 25 10 17 16 10 2 6 
R6 15 30 30 20 16 40 5 22 
R7 17 25 30 18 20 15 10 6 
R8 20 30 20 17 16 22 15 30 
R9 17 40 20 17 18 11 15 38 
R10 20 25 32 19 20 35 20 30 
COM11 10 20 25 17 17 10 2 15 
R11 15 40 25 25 35 11 40 40 
R12 17 20 28 27 40 40 40 40 
R13 18 20 25 18 40 40 40 40 
R14 23 30 25 17 40 40 40 40 
R15 20 20 25 18 40 40 40 40 
COM16 15 10 10 16 35 12 10 40 
R16 20 20 12 20 40 40 40 40 
R17 25 40 20 18 40 40 40 40 
R18 25 40 22 18 40 40 40 40 
R19 25 35 25 18 40 40 40 40 
R20 22 35 30 18 40 40 40 40 
COM21 18 20 15 16 35 30 10 20 
R21 20 30 20 20 40 40 40 35 
R22 25 40 18 20 40 40 40 30 
R23 23 25 20 22 40 40 40 32 
R24 18 23 22 20 40 40 40 38 
R25 23 27 30 20 40 40 40 40 
COM26 15 40 15 24 35 32 20 28 
R26 25 40 25 24 40 40 40 40 
R27 28 40 25 24 40 40 40 32 
R28 23 40 27 30 40 40 40 33 
R29 20 40 30 28 40 40 40 35 
R30 18 40 32 32 40 40 40 32 
 
 
 Group 7 Group 8 
 Subject 25 
Subject 
26 
Subject 
27 
Subject 
28 
Subject 
29 
Subject 
30 
Subject 
31 
Subject 
32 
COM1 5 10 1 20 5 0 0 5 
R1 10 10 1 20 5 0 0 20 
R2 15 11 1 40 8 0 0 20 
R3 20 12 1 40 10 0 0 40 
R4 17 20 3 25 5 0 0 40 
R5 15 30 1 30 5 0 0 5 
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 Group 7 Group 8 
 Subject 25 
Subject 
26 
Subject 
27 
Subject 
28 
Subject 
29 
Subject 
30 
Subject 
31 
Subject 
32 
COM6 5 10 1 20 1 0 0 10 
R6 15 40 1 20 1 1 0 10 
R7 13 12 1 30 5 0 0 10 
R8 15 20 1 25 1 0 0 10 
R9 10 20 1 20 1 0 0 10 
R10 15 20 1 20 1 1 0 10 
COM11 1 10 1 10 1 0 0 0 
R11 15 25 1 10 1 0 0 0 
R12 10 15 1 10 1 0 0 0 
R13 8 10 1 10 1 0 0 0 
R14 5 20 1 10 1 0 0 10 
R15 8 12 1 20 1 0 0 0 
COM16 5 12 1 5 0 0 0 0 
R16 5 12 1 5 1 0 0 0 
R17 5 12 1 10 1 0 0 0 
R18 6 12 1 10 0 0 0 0 
R19 7 12 1 10 0 0 5 0 
R20 7 15 1 15 5 0 0 5 
COM21 5 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 
R21 5 2 1 5 5 0 0 5 
R22 5 0 1 5 1 0 0 5 
R23 5 15 1 5 2 0 0 0 
R24 6 0 1 15 0 0 0 0 
R25 5 0 1 5 0 0 0 0 
COM26 1 0 1 3 0 0 0 0 
R26 1 1 1 3 1 0 0 0 
R27 1 0 1 3 5 40 0 0 
R28 1 0 1 3 1 40 0 20 
R29 1 0 1 3 1 0 0 40 
R30 1 0 1 3 1 40 0 0 
 
 
 Group 9 Group 10 
 Subject 33 
Subject 
34 
Subject 
35 
Subject 
36 
Subject 
37 
Subject 
38 
Subject 
39 
Subject 
40 
COM1 25 2 0 20 15 1 3 20 
R1 30 3 40 25 15 15 15 20 
R2 25 10 10 30 15 18 20 25 
R3 30 5 5 20 15 18 10 35 
R4 25 15 10 20 15 30 8 30 
R5 25 5 0 30 15 12 7 40 
COM6 15 5 0 10 5 5 5 15 
R6 15 7 0 10 5 15 15 30 
R7 15 5 0 15 5 19 10 20 
R8 17 8 0 10 10 15 30 15 
R9 15 5 0 10 10 5 15 17 
R10 15 5 0 10 15 10 10 15 
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 Group 9 Group 10 
 Subject 33 
Subject 
34 
Subject 
35 
Subject 
36 
Subject 
37 
Subject 
38 
Subject 
39 
Subject 
40 
COM11 10 2 0 5 15 7 10 10 
R11 10 3 8 15 20 7 15 10 
R12 10 5 3 15 15 10 13 15 
R13 40 5 3 5 30 7 10 20 
R14 40 10 0 15 20 7 10 40 
R15 40 4 10 20 30 20 10 10 
COM16 20 5 0 5 20 3 8 10 
R16 20 5 0 20 20 4 8 20 
R17 20 10 5 15 30 10 13 10 
R18 25 7 0 15 30 7 25 15 
R19 25 8 0 10 40 20 10 20 
R20 30 5 0 10 30 6 11 25 
COM21 5 6 0 5 25 5 5 15 
R21 5 6 0 5 25 10 7 15 
R22 5 6 0 5 30 7 20 15 
R23 5 6 0 5 30 6 5 25 
R24 40 6 0 5 30 12 7 15 
R25 5 6 5 15 25 7 25 18 
COM26 5 5 0 3 25 6 5 30 
R26 5 5 0 10 30 10 5 30 
R27 5 5 5 10 25 8 6 30 
R28 5 8 10 5 25 25 7 40 
R29 10 5 0 7 30 20 15 40 
R30 40 7 10 5 40 20 25 40 
 
2. Control Experiments 
 
The first 6 groups are taken from the Laury, Walker, Williams (1995) study. 
 
 Group 1 Group 2 
 Subject 1 
Subject 
2 
Subject 
3 
Subject 
4 
Subject 
5 
Subject 
6 
Subject 
7 
Subject 
8 
R1 30 20 15 30 40 10 30 30 
R2 30 30 30 35 40 20 40 35 
R3 30 25 20 35 40 30 35 40 
R4 40 23 30 37 40 15 40 40 
R5 35 22 30 38 40 20 35 0 
R6 30 23 40 39 40 5 40 20 
R7 30 23 25 1 39 15 0 25 
R8 30 20 40 40 40 15 0 40 
R9 30 21 40 2 40 20 35 0 
R10 30 20 40 3 40 20 35 5 
R11 40 25 30 0 40 25 0 40 
R12 40 19 28 0 40 20 0 0 
R13 30 18 35 3 0 5 25 0 
R14 40 15 20 4 30 20 0 0 
R15 0 20 25 10 40 12 40 0 
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 Group 1 Group 2 
 Subject 1 
Subject 
2 
Subject 
3 
Subject 
4 
Subject 
5 
Subject 
6 
Subject 
7 
Subject 
8 
R16 30 23 0 40 20 20 10 0 
R17 37 23 0 0 0 10 15 0 
R18 0 20 5 1 30 10 40 0 
R19 30 10 3 2 40 10 0 40 
R20 40 13 5 3 40 15 35 0 
R21 30 15 8 4 25 15 25 0 
R22 0 17 2 0 30 10 15 0 
R23 30 5 10 5 40 10 25 0 
R24 40 5 10 3 40 15 0 0 
R25 37 5 13 3 0 10 5 0 
R26 30 7 13 4 0 5 20 0 
R27 30 5 6 20 20 5 40 0 
R28 33 5 7 1 0 10 0 0 
R29 0 5 12 3 10 5 10 0 
R30 0 10 0 3 40 10 0 0 
 
 
 Group 3 Group 4 
 Subject  9 
Subject 
10 
Subject 
11 
Subject 
12 
Subject 
13 
Subject 
14 
Subject 
15 
Subject 
16 
R1 8 15 15 25 30 10 40 28 
R2 15 20 40 30 30 20 40 38 
R3 18 18 20 40 40 20 40 30 
R4 10 10 16 39 35 35 40 35 
R5 20 30 17 1 35 30 40 38 
R6 1 5 16 20 30 25 35 34 
R7 30 15 25 27 30 30 40 32 
R8 22 15 26 30 30 0 35 32 
R9 32 12 22 1 30 0 0 40 
R10 1 10 25 5 30 20 0 34 
R11 15 20 20 10 0 30 0 32 
R12 19 0 25 13 30 0 0 38 
R13 7 0 29 15 0 10 0 13 
R14 18 10 20 16 0 15 0 32 
R15 18 5 20 20 30 18 0 30 
R16 15 10 21 16 30 20 0 30 
R17 12 40 19 37 0 15 0 30 
R18 10 30 19 35 10 0 0 32 
R19 20 15 18 1 20 0 0 30 
R20 12 5 19 6 0 5 0 0 
R21 12 0 16 37 0 0 0 30 
R22 20 0 18 1 10 0 0 34 
R23 1 15 15 7 0 10 0 38 
R24 10 13 16 7 30 5 0 36 
R25 5 20 19 9 30 10 0 32 
R26 12 10 21 28 0 5 0 30 
R27 13 5 25 26 0 0 0 0 
R28 11 7 23 1 0 0 0 0 
R29 1 0 22 27 0 0 0 20 
R30 1 0 19 1 0 0 0 5 
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 Group 5 Group 6 
 Subject  17 
Subject 
18 
Subject 
19 
Subject 
20 
Subject 
21 
Subject 
22 
Subject 
23 
Subject 
24 
R1 30 30 40 20 20 9 10 10 
R2 40 25 40 22 40 10 15 15 
R3 0 15 40 26 10 16 20 30 
R4 20 25 40 30 5 16 20 25 
R5 35 28 40 25 1 14 20 40 
R6 35 28 40 8 1 25 20 0 
R7 0 15 40 0 1 15 15 5 
R8 20 15 40 10 1 10 10 0 
R9 35 20 40 20 1 20 15 15 
R10 35 20 40 10 1 15 30 10 
R11 0 25 40 9 1 17 30 10 
R12 20 15 20 18 1 20 30 12 
R13 5 18 25 26 20 25 35 14 
R14 30 5 40 0 1 25 30 16 
R15 30 10 5 20 1 5 25 14 
R16 25 15 1 15 1 25 20 14 
R17 10 5 0 34 1 30 25 15 
R18 5 0 0 0 1 15 35 15 
R19 0 0 5 40 1 20 20 25 
R20 15 10 7 2 1 20 20 15 
R21 5 5 0 22 1 25 20 14 
R22 20 20 20 0 1 20 10 15 
R23 20 15 5 20 1 15 20 15 
R24 0 15 2 0 1 30 16 15 
R25 20 0 9 0 1 20 20 15 
R26 0 0 5 0 1 25 38 15 
R27 10 15 40 0 1 25 25 15 
R28 15 30 40 0 1 25 25 15 
R29 30 10 0 8 1 30 26 15 
R30 5 10 0 0 1 20 20 17 
 
 
 Group 7 Group 8 
 Subject  25 
Subject 
26 
Subject 
27 
Subject 
28 
Subject 
29 
Subject 
30 
Subject 
31 
Subject 
32 
R1 20 3 40 4 15 5 15 7 
R2 30 20 40 6 23 10 5 8 
R3 0 25 25 5 5 8 5 15 
R4 15 35 1 7 12 0 5 2 
R5 10 17 1 4 26 2 5 5 
R6 0 20 1 6 4 0 8 20 
R7 5 20 1 8 10 0 9 0 
R8 9 5 1 2 2 12 1 5 
R9 35 30 1 8 18 8 12 5 
R10 30 30 15 4 0 10 11 10 
R11 25 30 16 4 3 15 0 12 
R12 5 32 1 5 10 0 8 9 
R13 10 30 1 3 0 4 5 30 
R14 0 25 1 4 40 15 0 0 
R15 15 25 1 6 4 10 0 0 
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 Group 7 Group 8 
 Subject  25 
Subject 
26 
Subject 
27 
Subject 
28 
Subject 
29 
Subject 
30 
Subject 
31 
Subject 
32 
R16 20 25 5 2 0 0 6 10 
R17 15 25 3 10 5 4 4 15 
R18 0 25 1 4 38 6 10 20 
R19 30 15 10 12 0 8 8 18 
R20 30 25 23 7 7 8 5 25 
R21 28 25 30 5 2 4 20 0 
R22 27 27 5 8 34 6 5 9 
R23 25 27 5 10 22 10 0 10 
R24 0 25 8 6 1 0 4 10 
R25 0 23 1 12 0 12 5 40 
R26 0 20 5 8 10 0 15 0 
R27 0 20 15 16 0 4 6 17 
R28 0 23 21 13 0 0 5 6 
R29 0 25 25 20 28 0 3 0 
R30 0 25 40 12 40 20 3 0 
 
 
 Group 9 Group 10 
 Subject  33 
Subject 
34 
Subject 
35 
Subject 
36 
Subject 
37 
Subject 
38 
Subject 
39 
Subject 
40 
R1 15 40 30 30 10 5 10 30 
R2 20 40 40 35 25 9 40 30 
R3 25 40 40 40 25 9 40 30 
R4 17 40 40 40 3 20 20 30 
R5 14 40 40 25 23 21 15 30 
R6 18 40 40 30 40 26 10 30 
R7 10 0 40 25 20 25 2 35 
R8 13 40 40 35 35 29 0 30 
R9 15 40 40 40 25 15 15 35 
R10 17 30 40 25 20 25 10 30 
R11 16 40 40 35 0 19 10 35 
R12 17 40 40 40 26 17 15 30 
R13 19 40 40 40 28 20 15 30 
R14 21 40 40 35 35 25 15 25 
R15 17 40 40 35 20 25 15 20 
R16 18 40 40 40 35 35 15 20 
R17 17 40 40 38 20 20 17 20 
R18 18 40 40 40 15 25 14 25 
R19 17 40 40 40 40 17 15 20 
R20 16 40 40 40 40 13 40 20 
R21 17 40 40 30 30 39 40 20 
R22 18 40 40 30 30 30 0 20 
R23 15 40 40 30 29 23 0 20 
R24 17 40 40 32 35 1 15 30 
R25 16 0 40 35 35 20 12 30 
R26 22 40 40 40 25 3 15 25 
R27 24 40 40 40 39 35 15 20 
R28 25 40 35 40 25 3 0 30 
R29 23 40 30 40 27 39 20 20 
R30 20 40 25 0 30 25 12 20 
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 Group 11 Group 12 
 Subject  41 
Subject 
42 
Subject 
43 
Subject 
44 
Subject 
45 
Subject 
46 
Subject 
47 
Subject 
48 
R1 40 35 25 10 20 15 20 15 
R2 40 32 17 30 20 20 25 40 
R3 40 37 19 20 0 24 27 40 
R4 40 40 18 40 0 20 22 20 
R5 40 39 15 10 10 15 15 2 
R6 40 30 22 20 30 0 12 40 
R7 40 0 17 30 0 0 12 20 
R8 40 2 19 0 0 20 9 25 
R9 40 5 0 0 0 5 15 40 
R10 0 20 22 10 0 5 12 40 
R11 0 15 0 0 0 10 5 0 
R12 20 0 0 5 0 0 3 0 
R13 0 10 30 15 20 40 3 0 
R14 0 20 25 25 10 0 18 40 
R15 0 22 23 30 0 5 20 40 
R16 20 25 23 25 0 10 20 40 
R17 30 40 27 35 0 15 25 35 
R18 35 38 17 30 0 17 30 35 
R19 30 20 19 5 0 5 30 33 
R20 0 20 25 0 0 0 24 40 
R21 0 0 0 40 0 5 18 35 
R22 0 1 20 0 0 15 40 40 
R23 0 1 35 15 0 20 36 40 
R24 25 10 30 0 0 22 32 40 
R25 25 20 20 25 20 5 35 0 
R26 40 0 25 25 10 5 25 0 
R27 40 10 10 20 40 0 15 20 
R28 0 11 19 35 0 5 5 25 
R29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
R30 0 0 0 0 40 0 0 0 
 
 
 Group 13 
 Subject  49 
Subject 
50 
Subject 
51 
Subject 
52 
R1 40 0 25 40 
R2 30 3 40 30 
R3 0 10 40 30 
R4 0 15 20 30 
R5 0 10 0 0 
R6 10 20 40 40 
R7 10 20 40 35 
R8 15 25 0 35 
R9 40 5 0 40 
R10 40 10 40 30 
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 Group 13 
 Subject  49 
Subject 
50 
Subject 
51 
Subject 
52 
R11 30 15 40 35 
R12 10 40 40 35 
R13 20 25 40 36 
R14 20 25 0 30 
R15 30 15 0 40 
R16 20 30 0 25 
R17 25 30 0 27 
R18 20 25 40 28 
R19 15 30 40 29 
R20 35 40 40 30 
R21 30 40 40 35 
R22 30 40 35 36 
R23 30 40 40 34 
R24 30 40 40 35 
R25 30 40 40 34 
R26 30 25 40 35 
R27 30 25 30 40 
R28 25 30 30 35 
R29 40 30 40 33 
R30 30 40 0 35 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
 This dissertation examines experiments using the traditional voluntary 
contributions mechanism in which opportunities for reciprocal behavior are expanded 
in an effort to facilitate cooperation.  Chapter 2 and 3 build on the literature 
examining opportunities to reward or sanction other group members within the VCM 
using a one-shot environment that eliminates the possibility of the use of sanctions or 
rewards for strategic purposes.   Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the effect of 
binding multi-round commitment opportunities within a repeated VCM. 
 In chapters 2 and 3, the effect of opportunities to reward or sanction are 
examined in a one-shot VCM design that has so far been unexplored by the literature.  
Previous VCM studies allowing subjects to reward or sanction other group members 
have used a repeated multi-round design.  Within the one-shot design of chapters 2 
and 3, rewarding and sanctioning cannot be used in an effort to influence the behavior 
of other group members in future rounds.  This allows the strategic motivation of 
rewards and sanctions to be separated from a purely reciprocal motivation, as only the 
purely reciprocal motivation is possible in the one-shot design. 
 Chapter 2 finds that some subjects are willing to reward and sanction other 
subjects at a personal cost within one-shot environments, providing strong evidence 
of reciprocal motivations on the part of experimental subjects.  However, 
opportunities to reward or sanction other subjects within the one-shot design are not 
effective in increasing cooperation in the VCM relative to the baseline VCM without 
reward or sanction opportunities.  This provides a counterpoint to the results of multi-
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round studies of sanctions and rewards in which cooperation is enhanced.  Further, 
chapter 2 compares behavior in decision situations in which the imposition of rewards 
and sanctions is certain to decision situations in which imposition is uncertain.  The 
expected value of the reward or sanction is kept constant across environments to 
focus simply on the effect of uncertainty about imposition.  Uncertainty does not 
change behavior in a significant way, either in the level of cooperation or the 
willingness of individuals to impose rewards or sanctions. 
 A possible reason that opportunities to reward or sanction did not enhance 
VCM cooperation in chapter 2 was that the possible reward or sanction a subject 
could expect to receive was too small to significantly influence VCM behavior.  
Chapter 3 examines opportunities to reward or sanction in which the cost of imposing 
a rewards or sanction varies relative to the cost of imposition, using the same one-
shot environment of chapter 2.   
 In the high sanction and high reward decision situations of Chapter 3, the 
effect of a sanction or reward on the earnings of other group members is doubled 
relative to the reward or sanction opportunities of Chapter 2, but the imposition cost 
of the sanctions and rewards is identical to Chapter 2.  In the high sanction decision 
situation, cooperation in the VCM is increased relative to the baseline VCM decision 
situation in which sanction or reward opportunities did not exist.  This demonstrates 
that sanctioning opportunities, if strong enough, can encourage cooperation even in a 
one-shot environment in which it is impossible to influence the behavior of other 
group members in future rounds.  Cooperation is not significantly enhanced in the 
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high reward decision situation relative to the baseline VCM decision situation, but the 
use of reward opportunities is expanded. 
 Chapter 4 explores the effect of opportunities to make binding multi-round 
commitments to the group account within a repeated VCM.  Subjects are shown to be 
willing to make significant commitments when given the opportunity.  Also, 
commitments are shown to strongly influence behavioral patterns within the VCM.  
However, commitment opportunities are shown to be ineffective in increasing overall 
average cooperation relative to control experiments.   
 Strong evidence of subjects following norms of reciprocity is found in 
Chapter 4.  Subjects respond reciprocally to other subjects when deciding how large 
to make commitments, and also when deciding how much to increase group-account 
allocations above commitments.  The results of chapter 4 are largely consistent with 
Bochet and Putterman (2004), a paper which studied non-binding numeral promises 
within the VCM. Although binding multi-round commitments have little effect on the 
average level of group-account allocations relative to the control experiments, 
commitments appear to cause a larger variance of group outcomes.  Cooperative 
behavior is enhanced in cooperative groups, and uncooperative behavior becomes 
more pronounced in less cooperative groups. 
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